A journal of views, comments, and ideas for effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism by non-state actors. Published by the Center for International Trade & Security, in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.
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From the Editor...
It was with some trepidation that our team at the University of Georgia originally proposed to launch this publication focusing on resolution 1540. Over the seven years since its adoption in 2004, resolution 1540 has generated a wealth of commentaries. What would be our niche? we asked. What new can we introduce into an already ongoing discourse?
Our underlying motivation is to identify a substance and a format that measured up by the criteria of clarity, specificity, and interactivity. Accordingly, the 1540 Compass will give voice not only to policy decision-makers, and academic community, but, we hope, mostly practitioners such as national points of contact, national and international officials responsible for practical implementation of the resolution to those who issue export control licenses, build physical protection, ensure security of sensitive materials, or inspect cargo crossing borders. We see it as a channel for intellectual cross-fertilization among all stakeholders who help implement 1540, directly or indirectly...
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Notes of Welcome
Seven years ago, the international community was faced with an important question: what could we collectively do to ensure that non-state actors, including terrorists, did not gain access to materials that could be used in the development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or their means of delivery?
Resolution 1540 calls upon states to adopt and enforce effective measures to address the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery, to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to such items or related materials.
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I welcome the initiative of the Center for International Trade and Security (CITS) to publish an electronic journal “1540 Compass” and its invitation to the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs to cooperate in this project. My Office is committed to work actively with civil society and academia on disarmament and non-proliferation issues and will continue to strengthen this partnership in support of the objectives of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).
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A strategy for the 1540 Committee
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 established a UN Security Council Committee to oversee implementation of the measures called for in the resolution, and it called on all member states to report on the laws, regulations, plans, and programs they enact to fulfill their obligations. The Committee works with states to ensure universal implementation of the resolution. As the U.S. Coordinator for UNSCR 1540, I believe this first journal provides a well-timed opportunity to consider next steps following the recent extension of the Committee’s mandate for ten years. These ideas are simply food-for-thought in the continued spirit of collaboration that is the hallmark of the Committee’s efforts.
1540 Committee as a Tool
Since it was established in 2004, the Committee has become increasingly valuable to UN member states striving to comply with UNSCR 1540 obligations. The Security Council has renewed the 1540 Committee’s mandate three times, underscoring the value of its work. The most recent extension came via UNSCR 1977 (2011), which authorized the Committee to press ahead for another full decade, until April 25, 2021. This long extension puts the Committee on a different footing, firmly establishing it as a durable mechanism in international efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It also makes it possible for the Committee to undertake long-range strategic planning, allowing it to program work and harness resources, stepping up and expanding its efforts to assist member states. The new mandate should also provide ample opportunity to strengthen cooperation with relevant international, regional, and subregional organizations (IROs), other UN organs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
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Personal reflections on UNSCR 1977
By 2005, articles in law journals questioning the legality of UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) seemed to dominate scholarly debate on its adoption by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Several states certainly believed that the General Assembly should handle the intersection between nonproliferation and non-state actors. To those of us appointed as 1540 Committee experts in early 2005, however, the debate on the legality of the resolution missed both marks.
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Challenges and Solutions for African 1540 Implementation
UN Security Council resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) was adopted in April 2004 to strengthen the international nonproliferation architecture and to address the possibility of non-state actors’ accessing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their components, or their delivery systems. Although UNSCR 1540 initially met with some resistance from the developing world, many African states have subsequently expressed their support for the resolution. Enacted in April 2011, UNSCR 1977 extended UNSCR 1540’s mandate for ten years—signaling the resolution’s continued relevance in combating WMD-related security threats.
Although states have made significant progress toward implementing UNSCR 1540, the resolution’s ambitious requirements continue to challenge some states, especially those in Africa. Unofficial estimates indicate that the resolution contains 113 specific prohibitions, 152 controlled activities, and at least 8 recommended activities. States often find themselves overwhelmed by these obligations and, in light of the expected expansion of nuclear power and nuclear-related technology, meeting these obligations will only become more demanding in the future.
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1540 implementation in CARICOM member states
In general, setting a new policy priority amid other, significant, ongoing challenges runs counter to conventional practice, particularly in the security domain. Since July 2009, however, the member states of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have embarked on an undertaking that indeed runs counter to this dictum, launching into an ambitious regional initiative to implement United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1540.
This effort represents the first time a group of countries has sought to implement a major Security Council mandate as a common, integrated enterprise. It comes at a time when the small island developing states of the Caribbean continue grappling with threats stemming from the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). SALW proliferation is interlinked with the illicit trade in narcotics, both within the subregion and in Latin America as a whole. This reality has serious implications for the economic and social viability of the Caribbean. As a result, CARICOM member governments have had to commit significant resources to deal with this growing emergency.
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The 2012 Nuclear Security Summit
The Republic of Korea (ROK) has been and remains a staunch supporter of the global nonproliferation regime as it borders a grave security threat and proliferator of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). South Korea is also familiar with the barrier created by nuclear proliferation to economic growth, trade and investment.
Seoul’s concerns soon evolved to recognize a new security threat, namely the nexus between terrorists and nuclear devices. This prompted the leadership to lend its full support for UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1540 in hopes of helping fill the gap in the existing nonproliferation regime.
With the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit just months away, the Republic of Korea should be more interested in enhancing UNSCR 1540, not only as the Summit Chair but against the backdrop of a “Global Korea” policy and the nation’s growing prominence in the nuclear energy industry.
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OPCW contributes to 1540 implementation
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) obligates all states to adopt concrete legal and administrative measures to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to and engaging in activities involving nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
As regards chemical weapons, these obligations are consistent with those enshrined in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These include but are not limited to the national implementation measures that parties to the CWC pledge to take in accordance with Article VII of the Convention. Parties to the CWC have already acquired considerable experience in fulfilling their obligations under the CWC. These experiences should prove equally useful for implementing resolution 1540.
The Organization foqr the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), a body constituted under the CWC, functions as an independent, autonomous international organization enjoying a working relationship with the United Nations and other international agencies.
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UNSCR 1540 and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Ten years prior to the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the states that take part in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) had already affirmed their commitment to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, agreeing on the 1994 Principles Governing Nonproliferation. The importance of the 1994 Principles derives from OSCE states’ endorsement of universal adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), as well as other international instruments. Over the past six years, a series of OSCE decisions and declarations have converted these sentiments into action, raising the profile of UNSCR 1540.
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CSOs and NGOs need recognition and support
In its resolution (UNSCR) 1540, the UN Security Council recognized the inevitability that some states may require assistance in implementing its provisions and invited states in a position to do so to offer assistance in response to specific requests to the states lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience, or resources for fulfilling such provisions.
One of the challenges of UNSCR 1540 is its lack of reference to the role that civil society and nongovernmental organizations (CSO/NGO) can play in the process of implementing it. The latest report from the 1540 Committee (S/2011/579 of September 14, 2011), instructively recommends that the Committee, States, and international, regional and subregional organizations cooperate with academia, industry, and civil society where appropriate, taking a long-term approach that can contribute to national implementation of Resolution 1540. It is more than obvious that active participation and involvement of CSOs/NGOs in the implementation of requirements of resolution 1540 is not only important but also imperative.
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Non-proliferation: social responsibility in industry
Industry must comply with non-proliferation and export control regulations. The essence of corporate responsibility, however, is exercising self-triggered caution and voluntary self-restraint towards questionable business while maintaining a trusting partnership with governmental authorities and international institutions. One of the easiest and most pragmatic solutions for industry to prevent unlawful weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) and missile projects is to proactively share information with government authorities and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), disregarding political and commercial interests.
Information as the First Line of Defense
Export control regulations hinder proliferation, but only to a point. For decades, the media have reported on illegal shipments of high-tech commodities, mostly with nuclear-related end-uses. While state actors drive their ambitious nuclear projects towards completion, private companies and other non-state actors often try to procure what is required for the nuclear activities. The IAEA already has access to information related to attempted, intercepted, and seized shipments of forbidden substances and materiel, and it knows about successful illegal transactions once these become known. However, many more sources of information are available to industry, as illicit purchasing efforts leave documented traces.
What Is Required Must Be Imported
Patterns of procurement have changed little over the past decades. Today as in past decades, countries and other entities pursuing illegal programs seldom have the resources and capabilities to produce the required technologies domestically. In a technological sense, these countries are far from being "autonomous" and depend on a limited number of exporting companies to obtain what is required for their illicit end-uses.
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Summary: Assessing the Economic Impact of Strategic Trade Controls
A common concern expressed by some states attempting to meet requirments under UN Security Council resolution 1540 is that implementing robust strategic trade controls could impede trade. As globalization accelerates worldwide, all countries are under intense pressure to acquire their niche in the global economy. The concern that strategic trade controls will impede trade is a salient one. The common logic from government officials is that strategic trade controls may make trade an inefficient, resource-intensive activity that reduces traders’ propensity to invest.
In cooperation with the U.S. Department of State, the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security (CITS/UGA) has recently conducted an academic study to gauge the actual impact of strategic trade controls on international trade. Conducted in December 2010, the study effectively dispelled the perception that strategic trade controls inhibit or constrict trade. The study examined the relationship between the introduction of strategic trade controls and a number of indicators for economic performance. Specifically, the study examined the claim that trade controls over high technology—in particular "dual-use" items—inhibit economic growth in general, and trade flows in particular. In examining both imports and exports, the study used data on trade in advanced technology products to and from the United States and the EU (prior to 2004). The countries selected for the study had introduced strategic trade control legislation. Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, India, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Pakistan, Singapore, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan were the states reviewed. The CITS/UGA researchers reviewed advanced technology product data for a year prior and a year after each state which enacted trade controls.
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