A journal of views, comments, and ideas for effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to prevent WMD proliferation and terrorism by non-state actors. Published by the Center for International Trade & Security, in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.
The 1540 Compass follows a "10 + 10" formula in the ensuing pages. The first 10 refers to 2014, when UN Security Council resolution 1540 turns a decade old, and must demonstrate tangible results to justify the global community's lofty expectations, not to mention the human and material resources dedicated to fulfilling its goals. The second 10 looks well beyond 2014, asking the essential question—"what comes next?"—during the 1540 Committee's extended mandate. The 10 + 10 approach will remain the guiding principle for the 1540 Compass during the years to come.
In this issue, readers will find an article discussing the role of the G-8 Global Partnership as a vehicle for supporting various facets of the UNSCR 1540 agenda. Another author argues that chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) security culture is integral to the resolution's sustainability and consistency. A report from Mexico tells a success story in which a country that meticulously builds a national system for controlling strategic trade items stands to win in terms of foreign trade and high-tech investment.
Two events are discussed in this issue—the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security in Tarnow, Poland and the 1540 Civil Society Forum in Vienna, Austria. Both demonstrate that stakeholders increasingly recognize that countering weapons proliferation and terrorism represents a precondition for a safe and secure world. Yet the activities associated with UNSCR 1540 still tend to be isolated and represent widely scattered dots that must be linked together.
These are just a few matters explored in this third issue. We encourage our contributors to keep looking ahead while critically examining the past. One issue we expect to explore further is an integrated approach to CBRN security culture as a platform to bring together all 1540 stakeholders. Please send me your ideas and proposals.
Finally, a letter in the Discussion Forum raises the issue of finding a better, more descriptive name for the resolution, relegating the four-digit name to the archives. Please send in your suggestions.
Welcome to the third issue of the Compass!
From Data Collection to a Comprehensive website
Four years ago, as a graduate student focused on writing an export control doctoral dissertation, I tried to find open-source information on the topic of nuclear export controls, but to no avail. Motivated by the ambition to share this vital information with many others, I launched my own website, Nuclear Export Controls, in 2009.
I realized that certain developments are challenging to the mission of UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1540, including countries' growing interest in developing nuclear energy infrastructure, the globalization of knowledge and production capabilities, and the illegal trade in materials, equipment, and technology related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The website was created in order to help countries address these issues by providing them with useful information related to export controls, as well as to increase the visibility of the issue in fields such as academia, law, industry, and public policy.
The website covers diverse topics such as civil-nuclear-cooperation agreements, illegal exports, prosecutions, developments in export control law, export control regimes, and treaty compliance. Almost all countries are covered, as well as many related issues such as border controls, dual-use materiel, enrichment and reprocessing, licensing, liability, and sanctions. The website organizes articles in a way that not only keeps readers informed, but also allows them to draw links and to identify patterns and trends in export control developments.
In January 2013, the UNSCR 1540 Civil Society Forum was held in Vienna, Austria, with attendees representing 45 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from across the world. A frequently raised question was, "What can civil society do for resolution implementation?" Yet this question precludes what civil society is already doing. Most participants shared exciting success stories that need more publicity, recognition, and support. The internet has expanded the reach of information, enabling my website, like other available resources, to start dialogues among individuals across the globe on matters relating to implementation. Undeniably, awareness-raising is a critical component of successful compliance, and it is my hope that the website will continue to serve as proof that civil society has a respectable and significant part to play.
A Platform for Nonproliferation Dialogue in Moscow
I would like to congratulate my good friends and colleagues from the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia on the publication of the first two issues of their new journal, the 1540 Compass. I hope that this new project will be as enduring as the mandate of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee, and that the journal will become one of the leading professional publications on the subject of WMD nonproliferation.
I would like to tell the growing audience of the 1540 Compass about the Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, which was organized by the think tank I represent, the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS). The "2012 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference: Nuclear Energy, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation" was held on September 6-8, 2012.
The Russian and foreign experts attending the Moscow Conference discussed a broad range of issues, focusing on the challenges currently facing the nuclear nonproliferation regime, including the prospects for multilateral disarmament, settlement of regional nuclear crises, and establishment of new nuclear-weapons-free and WMD-free zones. Discussions at the conference also centered on issues at the core of UN Security Council resolution 1540, such as export controls, strengthening nuclear security, and creating the necessary conditions for the secure development of nuclear energy.
One of the distinguishing features of the Moscow Conference was its diverse group of speakers and participants. About 200 representatives from 40 countries, including all of the permanent five members of the security council (nuclear weapon states) and all countries that remain outside the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, attended the event. Representatives of several Iranian research institutions took an active part in the conference.
Border Controls in a Wider Context
What does WMD trafficking have in common with illicit trade in consumer goods?
Everyone reading the 1540 Compass is well aware of the catastrophic consequences of WMD crossing the border and falling into the wrong hands, but many may not be aware of the scale of the market for pirated and counterfeited goods, most of which cross national borders to reach consumers. Europol recently highlighted that counterfeiting now affects a "wider range of counterfeit goods, including every day and essential items, with implications for public health."
The International Chamber of Commerce estimates that the value of the market in pirated and counterfeited goods will reach U.S. $1.77 trillion by 2015. Irrespective of the accuracy of this estimate, it is clearly a problem of enormous magnitude. Counterfeiting affects all categories of products, from sophisticated items such as airplane components, to ordinary consumer products such as washing powder, to items essential for survival, such as the food we eat or medications we take. According to the WHO, it is a reasonable estimate that between 10-30 percent of medicines sold in the developing world are counterfeit, and leading experts believe fake drugs kill over 100,000 people every year. But the implications of illicit trade reach beyond economic losses and public health.
The black market for contraband and counterfeit goods is a key source of income for organized crime and terrorist organizations. Al Qaeda, different IRA factions, the PKK, ETA, Islamic Jihad, the FARC, and others are known to have profited from illicit trade in consumer goods. Some of the very same groups have shown interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Once smuggling routes have been established or law-enforcement officials have been corrupted, they can be used to "facilitate" other, more lethal shipments in the future.
Resolution 1540 spells out the need for states to "develop and maintain effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items...." Clearly, any such efforts can only hope to succeed when overall border control and law-enforcement capacities are effective. Consequently, measures that address illicit trade and organized crime more broadly are prerequisites to counter the proliferation threat.
The greater our understanding of the broader impact of illicit trade, the easier it will be to set priorities for the fight against it, to the benefit of the broader security environment and counter-proliferation efforts. Here, civil society has a key role to play in raising awareness of these critically important issues.
Sustainable Capacity for Biosafety and Biosecurity
On June 28-29, 2012, biosafety and allied professionals from all around the globe descended on Johannesburg, South Africa, for the International Federation of Biosafety Associations' (IFBA) Second Annual Conference. The recently established South African Biorisk Association (SABA) had the honor of serving as the local organizing committee for this auspicious event. The conference proved to be a valuable platform for the SABA and other African biosafety associations to network and share experiences with veteran academics, regulators, experts, and scientists in the fields of biosafety and biosecurity. SABA was invited to apply for IFBA membership during the run-up to the conference, and it was inducted at the IFBA Annual General Meeting on June 30. This recognition will undoubtedly go a long way toward helping SABA and other infant organizations like it reach the goals of improving awareness, addressing training deficits, and implementing best practices for laboratory biosafety and biosecurity in South Africa and the rest of the continent.
Africa bears the enormous burden—perhaps the heaviest in the world—of infectious disease, in both the human and animal populations. It is also home to a plethora of high-consequence pathogens, including viral hemorrhagic fevers, communicable tropical diseases, and various bacterial zoonotic diseases. Laboratory workers face the challenge of diagnosing a myriad of contagions and are inevitably exposed to these pathogens. Lack of sustainable funding and insufficient infrastructure are two major contributors to dubious laboratory practices. Increasing demands for rapid and high throughput testing apply additional pressure on budgets, usually relegating safety to a back seat. Laboratory biosafety should be an integral component of laboratory practice and is essential for persistent, good-quality laboratory services. Furthermore, mounting biosecurity concerns impose an absolute obligation on laboratories to manage biological assets responsibly. These issues have been recognized through the implementation of the International Health Regulations, which have become a mandate for governments in Africa and globally.
The IFBA mission statement—"safe, secure, and responsible work with biological materials"—was the foundation for the conference proceedings. The conference theme, "Biosafety and Biosecurity, Building Sustainable Capacity," sent a critical message to Africa and other developing economies. The conference aimed at identifying novel strategies that foster affordable, practical, and sustainable biosafety and biosecurity practices. Over 130 delegates from 47 countries addressed issues like biosafety and biosecurity advocacy and policy, sustainable, risk-based bio-containment guidelines, certification of biosafety and biosecurity professionals, and effective use of available expertise. (Full details about the conference can be found at .)
A Universal Need for NGO Involvement
Though the last of Ukraine's highly enriched uranium was relocated to Russia in March 2012, the country remains closely involved in global nonproliferation efforts. Ukraine has voiced its support for efforts to implement initiatives such as UNSCR 1540, but the government nevertheless entertains second thoughts about including NGOs in the process.
For instance, local NGOs dealing with nonproliferation have been forced to stop or considerably limit their activities. The Soviet tradition of total secrecy lives on. Government institutions and state industries remain unwilling to interact with, much less support, nongovernmental organizations in sensitive or previously classified areas. As a result, the nonproliferation community has lost the few think tanks and whistleblowers that had the capacity to enhance public awareness and provide nonpartisan expertise.
The international community acknowledges the need for nongovernmental input. UN Security Council resolutions repeatedly urge all states to enhance their cooperation, information sharing, exchanges of best practices, and transparency so that UNSCR 1540 might fully be implemented. Unfortunately, it seems Ukraine is not the only country stifling NGOs. Consider the framework of Center of Excellence National Focal Points, for instance. Hardly any NGO representatives are within the network of 400 CBRN experts drawn from 35 participating countries.
Inadequate representation of nongovernmental players is likely to degrade the quality of implementation. Governments should encourage the principle of shared responsibility with NGOs, whose expertise and unbiased perspective offer culturally tailored assistance in developing legislation, regulations, and practices, and in conducting more effective public-awareness campaigns. These are all key criteria for successful UNSCR 1540 implementation. Ukraine is but one country that would do well to enhance the dialogue between governmental organizations and nongovernmental entities.
Holistic Approach to Implementing UNSCR 1540
There have been numerous UNSCR 1540 events, but we would like to draw your attention particularly to one held in July 2012 in Warsaw where Polish Foreign Ministry, in cooperation with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Stimson Center, hosted a seminar on "Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540: Innovative Approaches to Capacity Building and Assistance".
Participants from Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia engaged in a conversation on their national plans to implement UNSCR 1540 and on global and regional efforts to comply with the UN measures. The representatives of UNODA, NATO and OSCE honed in on their respective organizations' current activities and opportunities available for partnership in the area of WMD nonproliferation.
An important facet of the workshop was to highlight the interconnectedness between the capacity building necessary to combat the WMD proliferation threat and the required measures to fight a broader range of security concerns: organized crime and terrorism, trafficking of illicit drugs, small arms and humans, irregular labor migration, as well as trafficking in CBRN materials or dual-use technologies. The speakers highlighted that when an illicit trade route has been established, the same adjoining routes are used to move drugs, arms, people, cigarettes, counterfeit goods, antiques, etc.
Let us underline the role of the host of this event. Poland again confirmed its will to emphasize the importance of undertaking measures necessary to stop proliferation of WMD's to non-state actors. The government of Poland is determined to continuously support all UN efforts in this regard, including innovative approaches to UNSCR 1540 implementation. Subsequently, Poland will continue to support a regional cooperation within the frameworks of the 1540.
In an era of globalisation it is of utmost importance to apply a holistic approach to nonproliferation efforts. This means that the international community must engage with both the public and private sector to minimize the risk of nuclear CBRN smuggling and the illicit trafficking of dual-use goods. The 1540 Committee has stated that this is an important aspect of its work. A holistic approach is also necessary to understand that the implementation of nonproliferation commitments can support and supplement efforts in many other spheres related both to social and economic development of states and their national security. The workshop was an attempt at featuring the implementation of UNSCR 1540 in this dual-benefit manner.
Four Digits or Self-Explanatory Title?
As a Russian simultaneous (conference) interpreter, who has worked all his life at the United Nations, I happen to be one of the interpreters who were assigned to that special meeting of the Security Council that saw the adoption of the resolution in question under the name of UNSCR 1540. That was on April 28, 2004.
In my long professional career at the UN and outside I witnessed numerous meetings at which seasoned delegates and experts skillfully juggled with this combination of four digits often leaving newcomers, media and the public somewhat puzzled. There are numerous other resolutions gathering dust but this one is very special. It is all about our survival in the face of acts of terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction. In recognition of its unique role the resolution has been recently extended by 10 years and will stay with us for a long time to come.
I strongly believe that those four digits assigned to the resolution do not mean anything to many people outside a narrow professional circuit at best, and they risk creating ambiguities at worst. I have been wondering to this day, if it would be a good idea to come up with a short but apt description of the numbered title of the Security Council's landmark resolution. As a former UN staff member present at its creation and an avid Compass reader, I ask myself: why not announce a competition or a contest for the best self-explanatory title of the document which is destined to leave a visible imprint on our civilization?
[Submit your suggestions to email@example.com]
South Korea: The Art of Export Control Promotion
Although South Korea was a latecomer to the field of export controls, the country has developed a rather strong system for facilitating export control compliance. The Korea Strategic Trade Institute (KOSTI) was established by the Ministry of Knowledge and Economy (MKE, now the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Energy) in June 2007. Since its inception, the Institute has helped the government and industry significantly so that they meet their international obligations in the field of WMD nonproliferation export controls.
KOSTI's work ranges from classification, education, training, and research to international cooperation. The Institute utilizes the IT system "Yestrade," which processes requests for item
classification, reviews applications for export licensing and import certificates, and identifies items prohibited on UN sanctions lists. KOSTI uses Yestrade to help companies minimize the administrative burden and save time, thus making it easier for them to comply with export control norms. South Korea recognizes the benefit of stronger global export controls. From November 19-23, 2012, the MKE and KOSTI hosted a "Strategic Trade Week" campaign, with the goals of raising and spreading awareness in industry and the public while enhancing export control implementation. The week-long program consisted of a Workshop on Internal Compliance, a Strategic Goods Exhibition, and a Commodity Identification Training and Seminar, all focusing on national and international export controls. Attendees included dozens of foreign ambassadors to Seoul, as well as representatives from government agencies with jurisdiction over defense, foreign affairs, Korean unification, nuclear energy, industry, and trade.
It is my hope that our best practices will be of use to other countries constructing export control systems.
VERTIC's New Guide
To many governments, the process of implementing UN Security Council resolution 1540 through laws and regulations often proves overwhelming. In an effort to help states that are developing national implementation measures, the Verification Research, Training, and Information Center (VERTIC) has developed a Guide to National Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (hereafter Guide). The Guide publishes in one document the model laws, implementation kits, and handbooks compiled by VERTIC, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It will help states implement legal instruments to prohibit and prevent the proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons and related materials.
We hope the Guide will make implementing UNSCR 1540 more straightforward for states, particularly small ones with limited budgets and staffing for this daunting, complex undertaking. We also believe that the Guide will bolster compliance with the resolution and its sustainability as a nonproliferation tool.
At the time when UNSCR 1977 was adopted, we had already begun planning to expand our program to provide assistance to states executing international instruments to secure nuclear and radioactive materials. Such efforts complement efforts codified in the Biological and Chemical Weapons conventions. Our expanded program was officially launched at a VERTIC 25th-anniversary side event in Geneva, during the Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention. At the event we issued a white paper expressing our thoughts about the evolution of the international CBRN legal regime and explaining the rationale for expanding the scope of our program.
The 1540 Compass journal is a fine example of civil society's contribution to raising awareness and facilitating implementation of the UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in partnership with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs. I thank the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, USA, for this initiative.
What I particularly value in the articles that I have read is the authors' critical thinking and their consideration not only of the letter of resolution 1540 but its spirit as well. I will incorporate these valuable contributions in fulfilling my responsibilities as the chair of the UN Security Council 1540 Committee. It is my hope to celebrate 2014, the tenth anniversary of resolution 1540, as the ‘Year of Universal Reporting' and receive first reports from all UN member states. I will also strive to come up with effective ways to address other important areas where states have taken fewer measures.
In the course of our work, we will benefit from taking a whole-of-society approach, since our efforts towards nonproliferation contribute to addressing those threats posed inter alia by terrorism, transnational crime, and illicit trafficking. Through strong partnership and collective wisdom, we will be able to strengthen global nonproliferation against weapons of mass destruction while harvesting multiple societal benefits from this effort.
Resolution 1540 does not dictate how member states should meet their obligations. So, critical thinking and policy proposals, as I have seen demonstrated by the 1540 Compass authors and audience, are essential for evaluating existing national measures and identifying additional steps to be taken for effective implementation. I look forward to continued contributions from the 1540 Compass.
Stronger progress through increased collaboration and coordination
The 2011 extension of the UNSCR 1540 Committee's mandate for ten years was a seminal moment in efforts to achieve full implementation of the resolution. UNSCR 1540 is an important international legal foundation to promote nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems. Relevant initiatives and institutions can build on this foundation. 1540 is in many ways a vital part of the global nonproliferation architecture. As such, implementation should be pursued both nationally as well as through relevant regional and multilateral organizations. The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership or GP) is one such organization.
The Global Partnership and UNSCR 1540 share many commonalities. The fundamental one is that both focus on reducing the threats posed by chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons. This is unlike many other WMD initiatives that focus solely on one area, such as nuclear or biological weapons. In fact, the relationship between 1540 and the GP should be a natural fit. As an initiative that funds programs and activities to combat WMD proliferation and terrorism, the Global Partnership, through the collective work of its members, is directly addressing many nation's needs for assistance, and is helping match 1540 requests with offers of assistance by Global Partnership member states.
The Global Partnership, now with 25 partner nations, was established in 2002 as a 10-year, $20 billion initiative to prevent terrorists, or states that support them, from acquiring or developing WMD. To date, the Global Partnership has spent over $21 billion towards these ends. The Global Partnership has been a positive model of cooperation for combating WMD threats.
For those first 10 years, the majority of work within the Global Partnership focused on dismantling Russian nuclear submarines and Russian chemical weapons, though funding also went to other activities and programs within Russia and the former Soviet Union. However, as the Global Partnership neared the end of its 10 year mandate in 2012, the partners realized that the programs and activities of the initiative had to evolve to reflect changes in the global WMD threat. This is because the threat of WMD terrorism and proliferation does not originate from any one region; the threat is not limited to nuclear submarines and chemical weapons, but is also found in threats posed from poor biosecurity and weak border controls. More nations need to play a role in the work to reduce these threats. With this in mind, in 2010, the Global Partnership worked toward extending its mandate beyond 2012 and to be much more global in its activities and in its spirit.
The Global Partnership's Focus on UNSCR 1540
Since 2010, when Canada chaired the GP, partners have increasingly voiced interest in tightening the GP's collaboration with the 1540 Committee. Ambassador Heller, then chair of the 1540 Committee, and a fellow 1540 Committee expert participated in the October 2010 GP meeting in Vancouver. In 2011, during the French chairmanship, UNSCR 1540 experts once again briefed the GP members on the 1540 Committee's work. GP partners responded positively to the idea of integrating implementation of UNSCR 1540 into their work, and in increasing cooperation with the 1540 Committee. The partners discussed the possibility of GP members' reviewing requests for UNSCR 1540 implementation assistance, focusing on projects in which UNSCR 1540 data could have value. The partners also discussed their experiences in establishing 1540 coordinators for regional or subregional organizations, and in matchmaking between suppliers and recipients of export control assistance. At a time when the GP was considering extending its timeframe beyond 2012 and broadening its scope of its work, these positive exchanges provided the foundation for incorporating 1540 Committee work more fully into future Global Partnership activities.
In 2011, the Global Partnership agreed to the "Assessment and Future Options" document that formed the basis for the G-8 leaders to agree to extend the Global Partnership. With regard to UNSCR 1540, the assessment document noted that "The renewal of the Global Partnership could also provide an opportunity for countries to work collectively to implement WMD nonproliferation obligations under UN Security Council resolution 1540, including preventing WMD and related materials from getting into the hands of non-state actors such as terrorists." As such, the Global Partnership could be a vehicle for providing equipment, expertise, and training to enhance WMD nonproliferation and counterterrorism capacity in countries that have not yet met their UNSCR 1540 obligations and request assistance in doing so.
At the 2011 G-8 Summit in Deauville, France, the leaders agreed that while funds will still be dedicated to activities in Russia, the partners should also focus more programming globally in the areas of nuclear and radiological security, biosecurity, scientist engagement, and implementation of UNSCR 1540. They also agreed that new members should be sought so that the partnership would have truly global representation.
As a result of the leaders' decision in Deauville, the Global Partnership is now mandated to support the 1540 Committee in implementing the resolution. All GP programs and activities funded by GP members are in fact UNSCR 1540-related programs. The GP has increasingly engaged with the 1540 Committee in an effort to find ways to provide assistance when countries file requests through UNSCR 1540 mechanisms. The Global Partnership, like the 1540 Committee, has worked to build synergies and expand collaborative efforts.
In order to improve coordination and exchanges of information on activities and projects in the field of WMD nonproliferation, in 2012 the U.S. chair of the GP invited all relevant international organizations (IOs) to attend Global Partnership meetings. The United States recognized early on the importance of including 1540 Committee experts in these meetings, since implementing UNSCR 1540 is one of the four extended mandates of the Global Partnership. UNSCR 1540 experts attended all five GP meetings in 2012. UNSCR 1540 experts also engaged in many informal meetings with representatives from GP states and international organizations. Such contacts were related to requests for assistance submitted to the 1540 Committee. Furthermore, UNSCR 1540 experts chaired regional breakout sessions during the GP meetings, providing a forum for discussion with partners and IOs on existing and proposed assistance projects, including those aimed at facilitating the implementation of UNSCR 1540.
The 1540 Committee's participation in GP meetings also helps to facilitate communication between the Committee and other IOs. UNSCR 1540 experts interacted with relevant IOs at GP meetings, building
on existing connections between the GP and IOs and fostering the establishment of new relationships. During the meetings, IO-specific sessions focused on the need to develop new areas for cooperation and prepare relevant papers on opportunities for collaboration between the GP and IOs.
Participation from IOs has been very helpful, spanning a breadth of capacities and interests. IOs and other organizations participating in the meetings include the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit, the Financial Action Task Force, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, INTERPOL, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Organization of American States, the UN 1540 Committee, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research, the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the World Customs Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health, and the World Health Organization.
In its January 2012 letter to the U.S. G-8 presidency, the 1540 Committee referred to the consolidated list of implementation assistance requests approved by the Committee and shared with the G-8 partners. It welcomed a substantive, proactive dialogue with the G8 partners on this issue. At the first GP meeting for 2012, UNSCR 1540 experts presented the list of all requests made to the Committee. In each case they also listed specific GP countries and relevant IOs that the experts believed would be able to provide assistance to meet these requests. At other meetings, the UNSCR 1540 experts provided updates on the consolidated list of assistance requests shared with the partners.
Specific Areas of GP and 1540 Cooperation
The 1540 Committee noted several objectives when participating in the Global Partnership meetings in 2012, including:
- Presenting on current activities of the 1540 Committee and the experts, with stress on recent developments such as assistance issues and country-specific activities;
- Working directly with GP members on matchmaking using the consolidated list of assistance requests approved for sharing with the GP;
- Discussing visits to states, voluntary national plans, and other new tools and practices for facilitating assistance;
- Participating in regional breakout sessions;
- Encouraging GP participants to submit points of contact to the 1540 Committee to whom assistance requests that come to the Committee can be forwarded;
- Discussing actions taken, trends in assistance, and exchange lessons learned.
In August 2012, Ambassador Sangqu, then-chair of the 1540 Committee, attended the GP meeting in Stockholm. During his presentation, Ambassador Sangqu noted a number of areas where the Global Partnership and the 1540 Committee can work together. He highlighted the following areas of cooperation and coordination:
- Regular information-sharing with the GP on assistance and capacity building;
- Enhancing collaborative efforts to meet common goals;
- Sharing of information about UNSCR 1540-related events, means for working with states on implementation, and procedures for channeling assistance where requested;
- Facilitating in-depth discussions of ongoing and future projects that GP members can coordinate and fund that may yield new opportunities for collaboration;
- Continuing to brief the GP on the status of assistance requests and matchmaking activities, with a view to facilitating delivery of assistance related to implementing UNSCR 1540 in a timely and effective manner.
Ambassador Sangqu also noted that the 1540 Committee is interested in "consistent dialogue" on the consolidated list of assistance requests. He highlighted the interest of the 1540 Committee in "further information from the Global Partnership on 1540-related matters." Following the GP meeting in Stockholm, the 1540 Committee noted in its information document that "a considerable amount of information was shared by Global Partnership members and IOs, which is useful for the work of the 1540 Committee and the experts to facilitate further assistance in match making and coordination of efforts in a Global Partnership context."
In November, Ambassador Sangqu presented an informal paper to the U.S. GP chair on behalf of the 1540 Committee, supporting enhanced cooperation between the GP and the 1540 Committee. In addition to highlighting areas of collaboration, the document provides that "the 1540 Committee and the Global Partnership support the shared goal of preventing by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems." The document also noted that the 1540 Committee and the UNSCR 1540 experts look forward to working on concrete proposals from the Global Partnership members, for example in the areas of legal and technical training and expertise.
Since Global Partnership members are engaged in programs in every region, their engagement provides a vehicle not only to promote 1540 but also to help ensure that any assistance provided is informed by existing UNSCR 1540 requests. The GP can also help ensure that countries notify the 1540 Committee when GP programs are fulfilling an existing UNSCR 1540 assistance request. This is particularly important since only the state that requested assistance can inform the 1540 Committee that the state's request is being fulfilled.
In addition, the GP produces a detailed document each year that lists the programs funded by the GP members. The information in the document's annex can be of great value to the 1540 Committee. Prepared by each member and consolidated by the chair of the GP, the information lists a description of each program, the country where the program is taking place, and how much money has been spent on it. The information requested in 2012 provides more details than prior submissions. For the first time, for example, it notes when funding is provided to an international organization. All of the funding, regardless of whether it is bilateral, provided in cooperation with other nations, or goes to an IO, is funding that promotes the objectives and implementation of UNSCR 1540. This is useful background for ongoing efforts and for matching requests.
Significant progress was achieved in 2012 toward bringing together the Global Partnership and the 1540 Committee as the GP executes its mandate to implement UNSCR 1540. This progress will hopefully continue in 2013 and in the future. The relations between the two bodies should be strengthened further. Improved communication among the 1540 Committee, the GP, and IOs benefits all involved.
Both the GP and the 1540 Committee should also continue to explore ways to increase matchmaking between 1540 requests and assistance. The GP annex produced each year and the annual 1540 requests should be used to help in this respect. The GP should also continue to work with the 1540 experts attending the meetings, helping ensure that the objectives outlined by the Committee and Ambassador Sangqu are realized. After all, those objectives promote the goals of both UNSCR 1540 and the GP—reducing the threats posed by WMD terrorism and proliferation.
Finally, to ensure that UNSCR 1540 can continue to promote its goals, GP members and other nations should consider contributing to the 1540 fund directly, making in-kind contributions, or furnishing cost-free training for use by the 1540 Committee.
Border control and CBRN security culture
The adoption of UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1977 (2011), which extended the lifespan of the 1540 Committee, imposed the question: what should the Committee’s mission be during its new mandate?
Judging from the Committee’s mission of encouraging all states to prepare national action plans and to promote the sharing of experience, lessons learned, and effective practices in areas covered by UNSCR 1540, the authors of the “Blueprint of CBRN Security Culture” article in Issue no. 2 of this journal have reached a very good answer to the abovementioned question. The authors point out that “the major task to keep this emerging institution on track is to identify a common foundation for threat perceptions and compliance motivation among all those who are supposed to organize, promote, and implement this process in the evolving threat environment.”
I would like to stress two points in this sentence: its identification of a common foundation for threat perceptions, and its comments on implementation. I will return to these two points later in this text. But the good thing about the article is that the authors did not stop with merely defining future tasks for the 1540 Committee. They provided a clear and simple answer to how to do that. “A Blueprint of CBRN Security Culture” is a worthy document. Though it is not revolutionary, as the authors had the IAEA Model of Nuclear Security Culture as a model for their blueprint, its worth lies in its simplicity and clarity. Its four points apply to any country, any agency, and any society, regardless of its specific needs and circumstances.
Time of evaluation
There are four steps that each state, organization, and agency should take to fulfill the requirements set forth by UNSCR 1540. Those steps are bolstering situational awareness, setting the legal framework, planning operational measures, and evaluating and improving performance.
The adoption of UNSCR 1977 marks a successful end to the time of evaluation, and the beginning of efforts to update our plans. So what can we conclude about the previous mandate of the 1540 Committee, taking into account the abovementioned steps?
The 1540 Committee has played an extremely important role in the process of placing nonproliferation on the agenda of every important security panel. Every country is now aware of the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threat, thanks to the Committee’s work. How deep that awareness is must remain a matter for future discussions, but the Committee’s work has planted UNSCR 1540 around the globe. And that was its primary task.
Setting of legal framework
In most countries the legal frameworks for implementing UNSCR 1540 have been enacted, or, at least, processes for doing so have been started thanks to the Committee’s help. It is true that some countries have lagged in this process, but the Committee has taken steps to provide help wherever needed. The Committee’s workshops around the world have been packed by representatives from various organizations, providing expert help to states building up their legal capacity.
Planning of operational measures
This step depends mainly on local needs and circumstances. Different countries have different political, legal, and law-enforcement organizations. There can be no off-the-shelf recipe for all countries. But the principles behind planning can be the same. The Committee has tried to show different approaches and underline best practices. It has encouraged cooperation and information-sharing among agencies and countries, winning plaudits for its endeavors. Cooperation between the European Union and the Republic of Croatia, which led to better implementation of UNSCR 1540 in the latter, was often cited as a good example of cooperation between a small country and economy and a big international organization.
The unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1977 represents a clear sign that the UN Security Council thinks the 1540 Committee is doing its job well. Of course, parties could be found who would say the Committee could do a better job. But the time of evaluation is a good time to ask ourselves: could we do it better without the Committee?
Border Management and CBRN Security Culture
Law-enforcement agencies involved in border management have the same obligation: to evaluate their performance in implementing UNSCR 1540 in the field.
In its point 3(c), UNSCR 1540 says that all states shall “[d]evelop and maintain effective border controls and law enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when necessary, the illicit trafficking of such items in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law.”
This sentence places great importance on border controls. But even without this specific sentence, the essence of proliferation is moving an object from one point to another. That is why border management exists as one of the central parts of our whole nonproliferation system.
Nowadays the most developed countries have introduced systems for handling their borders, known as integrated border management (IBM). IBM has been developing within the two most prosperous economic associations in the world, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union. Although a bit different in approach and practice, these two IBM systems handle their borders in a way that networks all relevant agencies dealing with cross-border movement of people and goods, providing security without placing unnecessary obstacles in the way of that movement.
Information- and knowledge-sharing, cooperation, interoperability, joint risk analysis, training, operations, and evaluations are the essential parts of the system.
Unlike NAFTA, the European Union has decided to abolish all internal borders between member states. That move elevates the importance of external borders while raising the question of standardizing and possibly unifying border management across all member states. Taking into account the specific position of the European Union under international law—an association trying to interconnect its twenty-seven member states as much as possible without removing their individuality under international law—one can say that the European Union has developed a unique system of voluntary standardization in various fields. In fact, standardization of border control within the EU legal framework occurred only three years after the creation of the European Union, through the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). Many guiding documents have been issued by Brussels bodies since then to develop a standardized system of management of the external borders and help member and candidate states arrange their border-management systems to conform to EU standards.
Although far from perfect, this kind of international cooperation between states, especially regarding standardizing border-management systems, constitutes a good practice for fulfilling the UNSCR 1540’s point 3(c). The integrated-border-management philosophy is a good tool for spreading CBRN security culture.
Implementing the Blueprint Using IBM
Using the Blueprint of CBRN Security Culture set forth in issue no. 2 of this journal, we should determine how to use integrated border management as a tool for spreading that culture. IBM, with its developed structure of interagency cooperation in the fields of joint planning, joint operations, joint training, and evaluation, offers an excellent opportunity to disseminate CBRN security culture on a large scale.
In proposing how to implement CBRN security culture, meaning UNSCR 1540, through the existing structure of IBM, I am going to use the four points given in the Blueprint as the answer to the question, “why CBRN security culture?” Those four points are not just the answer to the question, but clear guidelines on how to introduce it into our societies.
The first point mentions the obligations of state institutions and organizations responsible for implementing UNSCR 1540. They “must instill common beliefs, assumptions, and values in their workforces…they need to adjust their cultures to the new norms codified by 1540. Without a robust, comprehensive culture reinforcing the counter-WMD mandate, an institution risks falling short of even modest expectations.”
Starting from this point, each state agency included in the IBM structure should:
- Make a realistic examination of threat perceptions among its staff and in its operational plans.
- Despite the fact that the agencies within the IBM structure are run by professionals, CBRN threat perceptions can lose their weight among staffs. The reasons can be different. Staff members may take the attitude that their country is politically and economically irrelevant in international relations. Such attitudes typify thinking in small countries. “It will never happen in our country” is another way of thinking present among some professionals, and it is a devastating one for even the best operational plans. Wishful thinking can be exacerbated by the assumption that enforcing UNSCR 1540 will needlessly harm the national economy. Both attitudes are wrong and negative. It can happen in any country, no matter how insignificant or small it may be in someone’s eyes. It is true that not all countries represent target countries or source countries for CBRN materiel, but any country can be a transit country or a logistical base for a front company. The “small and insignificant countries” are perfect choices to serve as transit countries and logistical bases.
- Based on realistic evaluations and realistic threat perceptions, update its internal and joint risk analyses to take the CBRN threat into full account.
- Update its operational plans and promote CBRN security culture within interagency cooperation.
- Use the existing structures for internal and joint training as a tool to spread CBRN security culture among its staff.
- Each agency should incorporate UNSCR 1540 into its educational curriculum and training programs. To what extent UNSCR 1540 is present in the educational curricula of law-enforcement agencies could be a topic of research of the 1540 Committee during its new mandate. How deep is knowledge about the CBRN threat, and especially about dual-use materials, among law-enforcement agencies’ staffs? One such research project, for example at the EU level, could give us enlightening and useful results.
The second point of the Blueprint mentions an extremely important thing for development of CBRN security culture: “...how to enlist nongovernmental stakeholders whom the resolution does not bind.”
The fact is that most of those nongovernmental stakeholders know little about UNSCR 1540 and its importance in the modern world. Some simply do not care. What is there to do in such cases?
The IBM structure in this case lacks efficient instruments. Its structure envisages regular and ad hoc meetings among representatives from agencies included in the IBM network on the national, regional, and local levels. But there are no representatives from nongovernmental stakeholders among those agencies. The IBM structure thus leaves open the possibility that even agencies which are not formally part of the IBM network can send their representatives to IBM coordination meetings, and participate in joint operations when necessary. This could be done upon request from the original members of the IBM network. But even in those cases, “guest members” would always be representatives of some state agency. So, we can conclude that the IBM structure lacks a mechanism for dialogue with nongovernmental stakeholders. Such a mechanism seems very important for developing CBRN security culture.
Nevertheless, some good practices can be found in this field. Those practices are not connected with UNSCR 1540, and not even with border control, but they are good examples of cooperation between state agencies and nongovernmental stakeholders. Furthermore, the nongovernmental stakeholders gladly participate in that cooperation, seeing it as extremely useful for their businesses.
After the upsurge of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the German Federal Maritime Police established an information center for all German maritime companies. Thanks to that center, much useful information regarding anti-piracy self-protection measures went out to German companies. The German maritime companies quickly adopted the “anti-piracy security culture” that brought excellent results for their businesses. Why should we not use the existing IBM structure and this fine example to spread CBRN security culture among nongovernmental stakeholders to help implement UNSCR 1540? Some next steps:
- The 1540 Committee and the national authorities must keep UNSCR 1540 present in every important discussion concerning politics, economics, and international trade.
- National authorities should establish information centers accessible to nongovernmental stakeholders at any moment with few formalities.
- Expert advice regarding the implementation of UNSCR 1540 should be provided to legal and international trade bodies by the national authorities. This advice should be free of charge.
- A clear set of rules of international trade that comply with UNSCR 1540 should be set up by the national authorities, with clear legal penalties for noncompliance with UNSCR 1540 and, by extension, a negative impact on nongovernmental stakeholders’ businesses.
In its third and fourth point, the Blueprint of CBRN Security Culture mentions two very important things: breakthroughs in science and technology, and organization of a model of sustainable CBRN culture and information-sharing among expert bodies.
These two points are crucial to the development of a global CBRN security culture. The Blueprint mentions biosynthesis and nanotechnology as examples of science and technology development that could provide proliferators with “products less susceptible to the regulatory process.” Detecting such products requires extensive expert knowledge. My question is: in what measure we can expect such highly educated experts to be present along the border, the first line of nonproliferation defense? Such experts are rare, and they are mostly located in distant research centers. The next question would be: can we expect every country to have such experts and research centers? No, we cannot. And we can be sure that proliferators who are familiar with biosynthesis and nanotechnology will choose such countries for their route.
What can be done? Once again, I am going to use a good practice from IBM to offer the answer. Border-control issues are complex issues. In any specific case an officer may have to apply knowledge from many fields, including border policing, customs regulations, sanitary regulations, or veterinary regulations. It is absolutely impossible to expect a border police officer to be an expert in all of those fields. That is why IBM envisages making a network of experts in those fields available for consultation 24/7. An officer can request advice from any expert included in the network.
If we apply this model to CBRN security culture, a network of experts in CBRN fields will be developed. That network should be able to provide officers with answers to CBRN-related questions on short notice. It would be much easier to do this in countries where the appropriate experts and research centers already exist, because it would be a national network. But what about countries without such people and institutions? Building national human capacity is a good solution, but it takes time and money. Maybe a global network is the solution. Interpol or Europol are examples. These international networks, accessible 24/7, provide expert information within a reasonable period of time. Very often that is all that is needed. In this time of global communication, such a network is feasible. Information-sharing, threat awareness based on expert knowledge, and development of response capability should be the cornerstones of the global CBRN security culture. And the 1540 Committee should consider this a target during its new mandate.
The instructive case of the European Union
Resolutions 1540 and 1977 recognize regional organizations as important players in the implementation of the provisions—especially those related to delivering, receiving, and coordinating assistance. The European Union and its member states can support implementation of the resolutions in several ways.
First, the European Union can fully implement the resolution on its territory, including overseas territories, and request full implementation in EU candidate states. The expansion of the European Union from fifteen members in 2004 to twenty-seven in 2007 posed a major implementation challenge in areas such as export controls. Many EU candidate states lacked adequate export controls and remained outside of the export control regimes at the time of enlargement. Their entry into the EU single market, in which most dual-use goods move freely, posed a potential proliferation risk. Closing this gap has been a major undertaking for the European Union in the past decade. Future enlargement will pose new challenges in a number of relevant areas that are at least as serious. The experiences of newer member states will be very relevant for future candidate states, and potentially also for other assistance recipients. The successful enlargement of the Union changed the geographical focus of EU nonproliferation assistance while requiring that assistance measures be coordinated among a larger group of states with more resources. The European Union is often viewed as being in compliance with resolution 1540, but implementation is uneven—both geographically and by function. In particular, the EU overseas territories may not be covered by common EU policy (and in the case of Greenland, may not even be a part of the EU). On the other hand, not all functional issues under the resolution are covered by a common EU regulation or policy. As a result, measures to combat financing of proliferation, for example, are much more developed in some member states than in others.
Secondly, the European Union can assist in implementing resolution 1540 through political, technical, and financial support to the 1540 Committee. EU member states have supported extending the mandate of resolution 1540 in the Security Council since 2004, and have made joint statements supporting the process. Several EU member states have made financial contributions to the work of the Committee, and they have twice agreed in the Council on funding for 1540 Committee activities—first, in 2006, to support national reporting, and second, in 2008, on export controls. Some member states have chaired working groups in the Committee, and in this capacity also committed additional national resources to organize relevant events. This included a meeting of international, regional, and subregional organizations to promote the implementation of resolution 1540. This gathering was hosted by Austria in 2010, while Austria held the chair of the working group on cooperation. Germany co-funded an industry outreach conference last year, illustrative of Germany’s role as chair of the 1540 working group on implementation. In total, the European Union has been among the most generous financial supporters of the 1540 Committee.
Thirdly, the European Union may directly help states and international organizations implement resolution 1540. Although many of the EU assistance programs are not labeled “1540 implementation assistance,” assistance on strengthening export controls or border security for countering illicit trafficking of CBRN materials is nevertheless directly beneficial in this regard. Despite large numbers of bilateral projects, in general the number of UNSCR 1540-specific assistance programs is extremely limited at both the member-state and EU levels. The vast majority of EU support for resolution 1540 implementation is not delivered through the 1540 Committee, and many projects are not reported to that forum.
In short, the European Union and its member states have plenty of opportunities to have a positive effect on the implementation of resolution 1540. However, EU common action depends not only on political commitment and available resources but also on the EU institutional framework and the willingness of member states to integrate their work on these matters.
Most EU member states have offered assistance through the 1540 Committee templates, and many have reported on past bilateral programs and national financial support to nonproliferation organizations such as the IAEA and OPCW. The most common offer of assistance has been technical expertise, followed by sharing of experiences with drafting and implementing legislation, clarifying and implementing nonproliferation treaty obligations, conducting UNSCR 1540 national reporting, and raising awareness. Since 2006, as an example, most EU member states have contributed their expertise to an extensive dual-use export control cooperation program administered by the German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA) and funded by the European Commission. The focus of the project’s work was agreed upon jointly by the European Union and BAFA, and the geographical scope of the program has expanded to cover over 30 countries. The project rests on five pillars: legal, licensing, customs, awareness, and penalties. Activities within each domain have included study visits, outreach to industry, customs and legal seminars, training, awareness raising, prosecution and investigation workshops, production of handbooks, and so on.
EU institutions fund a large number of assistance projects related to resolution 1540, for example on border security and nuclear safeguards. Programs have developed from practical disarmament and nonproliferation measures, focused largely on Russia and based on engineering projects, to softer security governance projects in less developed states farther afield. In general it can be said that EU institutions have a functional rather than a regional approach to nonproliferation assistance, with a limited number of integrated programs. Besides WMD nonproliferation, related work is carried out in the areas of counterterrorism and CBRN risk mitigation, as well as in more specific functional areas, for example illicit trafficking of WMD materials. The European Union channeled its largest contribution to nonproliferation assistance through the G-8 Global Partnership. The G-8’s decision to include resolution UNSCR 1540 implementation among its core priorities could be highly important for future EU commitments.
In general, it can be said that the effectiveness of assistance programs is greatest where it builds on a coherent and clear set of norms and standards within the Union. This coherence facilitates engaging member states in the practical work of implementing a program. Positive synergy among EU financing, standards adopted at the EU level, and the active enlistment of member-state expertise can be a highly effective combination—as the export control assistance program illustrates. On the other hand, in functional areas where the EU lacks common standards—such as promoting biosafety and biosecurity—the EU has struggled to create external projects comparable in scope and depth to those in nuclear safeguards and export controls. The ongoing EU assistance measures on 1540 implementation face a common set of challenges, all based on the fragmented nature of policies and financial instruments in a regional organization like the EU.
The European Union lacks a coherent strategy on assistance
The European Union has no single regulation or policy on providing assistance in the area of nonproliferation. The closest it has come to a coherent policy on biological, chemical, and nuclear nonproliferation assistance was its WMD nonproliferation strategy from December 2003. Although the strategy predated resolution 1540, it highlights the need for support in strengthening national export controls outside the Union and in implementing international treaty commitments at the national level. Central to the EU strategy is the need to deliver political, financial, and technical support to verification regimes. The strategy promotes a policy of “effective multilateralism” aimed at strengthening existing legal and political norms and frameworks, as well as bolstering the UN Security Council as an important actor in the field of nonproliferation and countering mass-impact terrorism. As a guiding principle for EU nonproliferation assistance, effective multilateralism has been interpreted to mean that EU assistance should be delivered to the greatest possible extent through multilateral instruments. This approach has been partly modified in recent years. At present the biggest assistance program—the regional EU CBRN Centers of Excellence–is based on the idea of flexible cooperative networks rather than instruments of international law. The Centers are not just attuned to regional contexts but are fundamentally driven by regional dynamics. Rather than orchestrate the program through a multilateral body, the European Union has allocated €100 million to the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute to implement it.
EU assistance is governed by regulations issued by various EU financial instruments. Any state that is actively pursuing a policy that places it outside key international instruments is ineligible for assistance under the main EU budget instruments on WMD nonproliferation. As an example, based on the EU approach, joint cooperation programs on nuclear security have in the past excluded states which are outside or non-compliant with the Nonproliferation Treaty. States with the political commitment to join, ratify, or comply with treaties, however, have been the main targets for assistance. Furthermore, the European Commission has in recent years proposed opening up assistance to states outside these instruments. If it proceeds, the Union will adopt a more technical, less political approach to assistance.
The European Union has no dedicated budget for UNSCR 1540 assistance
The European Union has no dedicated budget for UNSCR 1540 assistance. EU member states must agree by consensus on each financial contribution from the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget, which in the past has only been able to cover projects up to three years. Since 2004 the EU has dedicated €670,000 to the work of the 1540 Committee based on two Council Decisions. This amount is very limited in comparison to similar contributions to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (€2.3 m), the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (€10.4 m), the Chemical Weapons Convention (€9.5 m), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (€33.7 m). The EU member states intend to follow up their decision on funding for UNSCR 1540 implementation assistance, which expired in 2010, but progress is slow.
As noted above, the European Union nevertheless has many other assistance projects on nonproliferation relevant to resolution 1540 implementation. Two challenges are to measure the positive impact from these programs and share results with important UNSCR 1540 stakeholders.
The European Union has been unable to engage all relevant stakeholders
The conceptual understanding within the European Union is that states are best equipped to counter threats from non-state actors. The Union thus can enhance this function only by strengthening the role of the state, especially control functions such as licensing agencies and customs. While acknowledging the proliferation threat posed by non-state actors, the 2003 EU nonproliferation strategy did not incorporate supra-state or non-state actors into efforts to address or prevent these risks. As a state-centric strategy, the 2003 strategy underplayed the longstanding contributions to nonproliferation made by common institutions within the Union, and has been unable to fully take advantage of EU technical organizations or to fully engage EU industry. Through Euratom, for example, the European Union has long experience with implementing nuclear safeguards in cooperation with the IAEA. This unique experience should better be incorporated into assistance programs. A remaining challenge for EU states and institutions is to reach out to industry and research entities to ensure they are aware of the risks and dangers and to draw on their competences. Although individual states have developed relations with their national industries fairly well, especially the larger ones, the European Union has no common strategy or outreach program to industry on nonproliferation.
Mexico has ratified every international instrument that contributes to the global nonproliferation regime: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention. By means of the Tlatelolco Treaty, furthermore, Mexico sponsored the creation of the first nuclear-arms-free continent outside of Antarctica. It is also that treaty's depositary.
Most notable among the international instruments to which Mexico adheres is UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). The resolution represents an express acknowledgment by the United Nations of the role assigned to export controls regimes as an instrument to prevent proliferation. The notion of export controls as an effective mechanism to defeat proliferation finds its root in the factual evidence that proliferating entities operate with complex buyer networks, brokers, and front companies that systematically operate to exchange fungible goods for the production of weapons of mass destruction.
Mexico's export control regime
Mexico's export control regime has two fundamental objectives: to 1) regulate the conventional arms trade, and 2) restrict the transfer, legal and illegal, of goods that can be employed to create conventional or mass-destruction weapons. The mechanism used to reach these two objectives is the imposition of trade barriers for these goods through export licenses (permits), as established in control lists. Indeed, all of the regimes have three things in common: a) regulation of export, shipment, transshipment, and re-export of materials that can be diverted to weapons programs or terrorism; b) control of transfers of cutting-edge technology; and c) reduction of the risk of proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems without inhibiting legal trade, including in goods on the control lists.
Among the export control regimes, the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) deserves special mention, as it controls the goods that represent Mexico's greatest business opportunities. Goods controlled by the WA are the major exports of the Mexican manufacturing industry. This is evidenced by the fact that Mexico's request for admission to the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2010 was coordinated not only by the National Security Council, but also by the Ministry of Economy. Joining the WA was sought as a geopolitical objective as well as a business opportunity. Mexico's accession to the Wassenaar Arrangement finds its legal basis in the international treaties that Mexico has signed and is considered the supreme law of the land in accordance with Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution.
Wassenaar's admission requirements include the following: a) that the requesting country owns a productive plant with enough capacity to export conventional weapons, dual-use goods, software, or related technologies; b) that it demonstrates an unequivocal commitment to international policy on nonproliferation of conventional and mass-destruction weapons; and c) that it has an operative export control system acknowledged by the WA's membership.
Mexico's high-technology goods production
Up until the formal petition to become a Wassenaar member on June 2011, Mexico had considerably increased its exports of regulated goods, but dual-use items were not captured by any regulations. Production and export of goods related to high technology has become one of the most dynamic factors in the Mexican economy within the past decade. In Mexico, this trade represents about 40 percent of the total trade in manufactured goods. For example, the aerospace sector in Mexico encompasses 232 companies. Of those, 72.1 percent are manufacturers, 12.2 percent perform repair and maintenance, and 12.7 percent concentrate on design and engineering. This sector employs over 30,000 people in 17 states, and it generated
over $3,266 million dollars in exports in 2010. The main export destinations for the aerospace sector are the United States (74.3 percent), Canada (8.1 percent), France (3.5 percent), the United Kingdom (2.7 percent) and Japan (1.2 percent). Seventy-nine percent of the Mexican aerospace industry is oriented towards manufacturing and assembling components, while 10 percent is geared towards engineering and design.
As a result, Mexico is an important participant in global high-technology trade. Opportunities for growth are becoming more numerous with the increased demand for high-end technology through emerging free-trade markets. Therefore, an industry as dynamic as that of Mexico must increasingly boost production of high-value-added goods and project it forward through concrete actions if it hopes to remain competitive. However, the majority of goods and services produced by high-end industry have the potential for dual uses. It is thus essential that in taking steps forward, the Mexican government ensure that the transfer of these assets is safe and that their final destination is legitimate and secure. Controls on dual-use goods clearly serve this role.
As argued thus far, Mexico fully complied with the first two requirements before deciding to request admission to the WA. Nonetheless, the last requirement implied different challenges, notably the creation of a fully functioning system dedicated to processing and issuing export permits, the adoption of regulations to sustain the system, and outreach to industry. Before Mexico requested admission to the WA, only exports of certain conventional arms and specific dual-use goods—especially chemical, toxic, and nuclear materials—were regulated, and those only partially. Therefore, the creation of a solid export control system was revealed as an essential task if our country was to meet its international commitments.
In adopting the regulations set forth by the WA, it was assumed that the desired objectives could be achieved under the authority of the Foreign Trade Law, and that this task should therefore be the responsibility
of the Secretariat of Economy. The legal framework that gave birth to the Mexican export controls system is the "[d]irective that establishes the requisite of a prior license granted by the Ministry of Economy for export of ammunition parts and components thereof, dual-use goods, software and technologies that could be diverted for the proliferation and manufacture of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction," published in the Official Journal of the Federation on June 16, 2011. This Directive, incorporated through four annexes, notes all goods contained in the lists of assets controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement. These assets were linked to the 360 numbers of the Harmonized Tariff Code under the General Import and Export Tariff Tax Law (LIGIE, in Spanish). The WA's Classification Number for Export Control was also included.
Another regulatory challenge faced by the Mexican government when adopting international export control regimes has to do with Mexico's foreign trade nomenclature. Article 20 of the Foreign Trade Law provides that, when subjecting goods to a restriction or non-tariff regulation, they must be identified with their corresponding tariff number and nomenclature. This is true in all cases. The tariff number is the identification code of the Tax Law General Import and Export designation set for each commodity to be imported into or exported from Mexico. Mexico's first assignment in integrating export control regimes with national law, then, was to adopt the language that the organizations employ.
Once the difficult task of identifying tariff numbers and nomenclature for controlled goods was complete, the Mexican government commenced the equally intense task of locating those goods that were subject to further regulation by the Wassenaar Arrangement. The work was completed in a remarkably short time, considering the magnitude of the task, and was published by the time Mexico filed for admission to the Wassenaar Arrangement, on June 17, 2011 in Vienna. At the time of its publication, the agreement centered on three lists of regulated goods contained in its annexes:
- Dual-Use End Goods
- Conventional Weapons
- Software and Technology
The Directive's structure enabled the classification requirements under the WA to be reconciled with the tariff number classification necessary for identification under the Harmonized System and the Mexican General Import and Export Tariff Tax Law. This form of regulation represented an innovative and creative response to the classification problem, allowing its adoption in the regulations of the Ministry of Energy for the incorporation of assets controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This is also expected to happen in the regulations pertaining to goods controlled by the Australia Group.
The Directive also provides detailed analysis of the nature of the controlled goods. This analysis includes the technical nature of goods to be exported, their final destination, their usual end-users, and the use that they are intended to provide. To perform such an analysis and, in general, to implement the Directive's regulations, an administrative unit within the Directorate General of Foreign Trade established a multidisciplinary team. The research team completed an intensive training program with international experts on proliferation risks, identification of dual-use goods likely to be diverted for military uses, international standards for export controls, and international experiences in the field. The Directive also gave birth to the Committee for Export Control, an interagency body that brings together all of Mexico's export control agencies. The Committee was established as a forum for discussion and consultation on all aspects of these matters, as the reviewing body for controlled-goods lists (in coordination, as established by the Foreign Trade Law, with the Foreign Trade Commission), and especially as the reviewing body for certain exports deemed sensitive or very sensitive, depending on the nature of the goods and the parameters set by the Wassenaar Arrangement.
The export control mechanisms created by the Directive—lists and regulations of controlled goods, issuance of permits, and the work of the Committee—are the regulatory and managerial foundations that supported Mexico's application to the Wassenaar Arrangement. The Directive has set diffusing these practices as a major goal. Intensive outreach programs outlining the new procedures have been developed within industry.
Mexico has been a full member of the Wassenaar Arrangement since January 2012 and joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in October 2012. The nation has adopted the lists of both groups in their entirety. Currently, Mexico is in the process of publishing the Australia Group's control lists for internal use in order to strengthen its application to that organization.
As mentioned, Mexico sought admission to WA with two main purposes. First, it adapted its legal system to standards set by the international export control regime, providing tangible evidence of its deep commitment to the goals of global peace and international security. Second, Mexico demonstrated the skills and abilities necessary to be considered a safe destination for investment in high-value-added sectors, especially high technology.
Adopting export control regulations has paid off handsomely in the area of foreign trade, allowing Mexico to be seen as a benign country of origin for high-technology goods. It has opened new markets and allowed access to our industrial processes, patents, and licenses to manufacture higher-value-added goods. These export regimes are clearinghouses where information is concentrated on technological innovation for military and civilian purposes.
Membership in export control regimes allows for technical advances in industry, as innovative companies are able to safely ship their goods to growing markets, knowing that the possibility of misuse (and the resultant harm to their reputation) is minimal. Increased trade enables these industries to thrive, and thus regimes become an incentive for private investment in research and development in these sectors of business.
Mexico's entry into the WA is, therefore, a specific mechanism that seeks to honor our international commitments while boosting the economic capabilities of our country through the production and exportation of high technology. A year after first being incorporated into the Mexican export control system, it has allowed the importation of sensitive or very sensitive goods by Mexican companies that are in the process of implementing technological innovation in their production lines.
The Mexican system remains to be completed. Outreach activities with industry should be ongoing, and updating the lists of controlled goods requires constant attention. Yet the unanimous recognition of the 40 countries that are part of the Wassenaar Arrangement is our country's first step into the field.
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China is committed to fulfilling its obligations under UNSCR 1540. Its contribution to implementing the resolution is demonstrated through China's national legislation and its cooperation with international entities.
National Legislation and Enforcement
Since the beginning of the 21st century, and especially after the adoption of UNSCR 1540, China has accelerated its pace of building nonproliferation laws and regulations. China has established a comprehensive legal framework composed of laws and regulations for preventing any unauthorized import or export of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile items. Such legislation is strictly in line with requirements of the international nonproliferation treaties, conventions, and other commitments that China has assumed. The third edition of the revised Criminal Law of China promulgated in December 2001 criminalized terrorist acts involving the use of toxic and radioactive materials, as well as contagious agents and pathogens. Any illicit manufacturing, possession, trafficking, theft, or use of such materials or pathogens for "harming the public" will be sentenced from three years in jail to the death penalty, according to the degree of damage and consequences. In February 2011, the Criminal Law further stipulated that those guilty of "smuggling of nuclear material" will be sentenced to three years or greater in jail, with an additional fine. Apart from the Criminal Law, the Foreign Trade Law and Customs Law also have clauses to punish illicit trading in and transferring of materials or items related to WMD or their means of delivery.
The abovementioned laws provide the basic legal framework for the government to meet the nonproliferation commitment required by resolution 1540 and other UNSC resolutions and multilateral conventions. To ensure laws are enacted effectively, the Chinese State Council has promulgated a number of regulations for the export control of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile-related materials and items. Such regulations have effects similar to those of law. They empower the competent government agencies and ministries with different mandates to regulate export activities and stipulate administrative punishments for noncompliance. Triggers are used to link the relevant regulations to laws in case of serious violations. Universal practices like license management, list control, end-use and end-user certificates, and the catch-all principle are all incorporated into the Chinese regulations. According to the registration mechanism, companies that want to engage in export trade for nuclear and missile-related items and technology are required to undergo special qualification and complex application procedures. The State Administration for Science and Technology Industries in Defense is in charge of authorization and approval of most sensitive exports.
Specified chemicals are also strictly controlled by the National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention. Only a few designated companies are authorized to export or import such hazardous materials. Dual-use items and technologies are the most complicated area for export control. They are governed by the Ministry of Commerce. The provincial and municipal Offices of Commerce are assumed to be the first shields against proliferation of dual-use items and technologies. They are mandated to conduct the first review of any application for an export license. As the Ministry of Commerce is the only agency mandated to issue export licenses, all licenses are standardized. Registration is required before a company is allowed to export dual-use items, further strengthening the regulations by ensuring that only companies with appropriate export records are granted registration.
Enforcement is critical to the effectiveness of the control system. Interagency coordination and cooperation is frequent and generally smooth. Customs plays a role in stopping illicit transfers, the Ministry of Public Security is called in if the suspected case triggers the Criminal Law, and an expert group composed of thirty experts from various backgrounds works under the Ministry of Commerce for technical consultancy and risk assessment. Drafting legislation and providing proper enforcement provides a very tangible shield against illicit trafficking or smuggling of WMD-related items.
Legislation and enforcement may be one side of the coin, but its reverse is just as important: international assistance and cooperation are crucial aspects of resolution 1540. Through active bilateral and multilateral interaction with the international community, China has gradually integrated itself into global nonproliferation efforts.
In 2004, China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group and immediately aligned its regulations on nuclear export controls and dual-use items with those of the NSG. In the same year, China applied for membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), another multinational regime for control of missile-related items and technology. Although China has yet to be accepted by the MTCR, the Chinese Regulations for Missile Items and Technology incorporates all of the principles of the regime, and the attached control list mirrors that of the regime. China also keeps regular dialogue with the regime, as well as with the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement, two regimes for chemical and biological dual-use items and conventional arms, respectively. Such dialogue shows the willingness of China to develop relations and share experiences with the international community.
China's positive attitude to resolution 1540 is also demonstrated by its active participation in the work of the 1540 Committee. From consultation to the implementation of the resolution, China has been very active and contributed a lot to the process. When resolution 1540 was passed in the UNSC, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce immediately published a notification on its website reminding Chinese industries of the resolution and explained the commitment China had undertaken in it. The Ministry of Commerce also held a lot of training courses for Chinese industries to promote awareness of the resolution and explained its implications for export controls. A number of training courses were also given to license and customs officials to increase their capacity for management and law enforcement. China has participated in many outreach activities of the 1540 Committee. In July 2006, for instance, China jointly hosted a seminar with the European Union and UN Disarmament Office on the "Implementation of Resolution 1540 in Asia-Pacific Region." Representatives from China also attended similar seminars in other regions. In 2006, China expressed its intention to provide necessary assistance to other countries to meet the demands of implementing resolution 1540. As of now, there seems to have been no concrete financial or technological assistance, but it is foreseeable that China will become more active in the work of the Committee.
Bilateral cooperation for capacity building and export control policy is conducted extensively. Cooperation between Chinese Customs and the U.S. Department of Energy has helped Chinese Customs officials increase their capability to identify sensitive dual-use items in the process of customs clearance. Such cooperation has been conducted for more than five years. The cooperation played a very important role not only for capacity building, but also for setting nonproliferation as a high priority in the daily work of Chinese Customs. Recently Chinese Customs officers have stopped more and more unauthorized transfers of controlled items based on their own assessments of proliferation risk, and although no one publicly links the increased capability of Chinese Customs with bilateral cooperation, its contribution is undeniable and may be revealed as cooperation deepens. It is reported that China is now discussing a new cooperation program with the European Union to raise mutual understanding and share experiences pertaining to export controls, from legislature to enforcement. The program reflects China's changing nature from a country seeking individual gain to one seeking mutual exchange and assistance.
Challenges and Opportunities for China
In light of the extended mandate of UNSCR 1540, China should carefully review its own establishment and its relations with the world in terms of nonproliferation. It is the right time and place for China to make use of its image as a rising power and of the extended, common understanding of the world to promote fair, objective, and balanced reform of the international nonproliferation regime.
China should more actively pursue a robust domestic export control system to fulfill its commitment under resolution 1540, a first step being refining its export control legislation and regulations. Additionally, public education in nonproliferation and export control is far from satisfactory. Sophisticated governmental agency coordination is needed in order to address this issue. The sheer size of China's territory and the sheer number of companies necessitates a strong public awareness campaign with sustainable efforts and a wealth of resources.
Enforcement is still the weakest link of China's export control system. Enforcement requires long-term investment. Human resources are an integral part of the enforcement sector. It is encouraging that more and more customs officials have been trained with export control knowledge. But a systematic approach is needed in this regard. Adding a curriculum on export control for sensitive dual-use items in the customs schools and other Chinese universities is worth exploring. China should also review its approach to intelligence sharing in regard to proliferation. Transparency in investigation and punishment of noncompliance or violation cases will greatly help to set a positive image for China in the area of nonproliferation and improve its relations with the Western countries.
The Chinese attitude toward resolution 1540, as well as toward nonproliferation in a broad sense, is based upon its relationship with the world. China regards the nonproliferation commitment as its responsibility as a rising global power, and it also recognizes that nonproliferation is in line with its own interests. China needs a peaceful environment for development, and WMD proliferation clearly poses a threat to regional and global peace and stability. China also attaches great importance to its soft power, and thus closely connects responsible attitudes and conduct in regard to nonproliferation to its image in the eyes of the world.
Chinese policy in nonproliferation has many advantages in my personal observation. China's proposition for addressing both the symptoms and root causes of proliferation calls for a balanced approach to nonproliferation and peaceful uses of high technology. Such an approach is very attractive for many developing countries, but China has failed to put forward any concrete steps or proposals to make it a reality. In the area of implementation of resolution 1540, China could make full use of the cooperation of the international community to practice a more proactive foreign policy, taking the initiative to secure peace and stability for the world.
Supporting implementation of UNSCR 1540
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) uses a multifaceted and layered approach to preventing, detecting, and responding to the illicit acquisition, fabrication, and transport of radiological and nuclear materials and devices. The ability to counter the nuclear threat is fundamentally based on the critical triad of intelligence, law enforcement, and technology. To maximize the ability to detect, deter, and interdict nuclear threats, DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) applies detection technology to intelligence-driven operations, using well-trained law-enforcement and public-safety personnel.
The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
Within the overall context of the United States' effort to counter nuclear threats, DNDO has the unique responsibility to develop a comprehensive global nuclear-detection architecture (GNDA) and implement its domestic component. DNDO fulfills this responsibility in coordination with other departments, agencies, and international partners. In addition, DNDO develops enhanced technical nuclear-detection capabilities, rates detector-system performance through robust programs of testing and evaluation, and executes transformational research and development (R&D) on advanced detection technologies. DNDO also works to better integrate the U.S. technical nuclear-forensics programs.
The GNDA is defined as an integrated network of sensors, telecommunications, and personnel with the supporting information exchanges, programs, and protocols that detect, analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials out of regulatory control. However, the inherent challenge is to enhance coordination and implementation mechanisms among the many programs, assets, and capabilities that contribute to nuclear and radiological detection and response activities, in order to best utilize all available personnel, equipment, and knowledge.
DNDO's coordination of the GNDA reaches across multiple pathways to support layered nuclear-security efforts and reduce risk. As a first line of defense, initial nuclear-security enhancements and detection efforts focused on physical protection at the source of the material. However, subsequent efforts to develop a broader detection capability have focused on the deployment of nuclear and radiological detection assets and capabilities at official ports of entry (POEs) or exit, and along borders between POEs. These largely fixed deployments formed the backbone of the initial GNDA, focusing on scanning cargo, vehicles, and pedestrians for nuclear and radiological material.
Further work to enhance the comprehensive GNDA highlighted the critical role of domestic law enforcement, as well as the need for more agile deployments of nuclear and radiological detection capabilities to align assets and capabilities for detection and search operations into a unified effort to prevent nuclear terrorism. Technological solutions developed to enhance the detection of nuclear and radiological material are just as important as the well-trained personnel who operate these enhanced detection systems. DNDO supports the development of nuclear-detection capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels, to include awareness, training, exercises, and equipment deployment. Mobile or agile detection components increase the capability to respond to escalated threat levels or intelligence cues by focusing detection assets on effective interdiction.
International Cooperation and Coordination for Nuclear Detection
DNDO is working to share technology R&D, training, and best practices for nuclear detection across borders. As a critical part of that approach, together with our U.S. government counterparts, DNDO collaborates both bilaterally and multilaterally on areas of shared interest to support and develop capabilities for radiological and nuclear detection.
An excellent example of this international cooperation on radiological and nuclear detection capabilities is the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program+10 (ITRAP+10) effort. The ITRAP+10 testing is a partnership between the European Union Joint Research Center, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United States to evaluate the performance of commercially available detection systems against a consistent set of international standards. The ITRAP+10 program is completing an ambitious project to test nearly 100 nuclear-detection systems in nine categories, ranging from (relatively small) handheld detectors to (larger) fixed port-of-entry systems. The outcome of this rigorous evaluation will better inform countries' decisions as they prioritize investment decisions for nuclear and radiological detection technologies.
DNDO also supports multilateral efforts to enhance the GNDA by engaging with current and future partner nations on nuclear-detection capability development. Under the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), a partnership among eighty-five participating nations and four international observers, including the IAEA, DNDO has spearheaded the development of international guidelines and best practices for nuclear-detection architectures. Developed within the GICNT's Nuclear Detection Working Group (NDWG), a body chaired by the Netherlands, these guidelines leverage and inform best practices in domestic U.S. efforts to enhance our national-level radiological and nuclear-detection capability, as well as the best practices established by our partner nations. As part of this collaborative effort, DNDO is leading the GICNT NDWG's focus on a four-volume series of guidelines entitled Developing a Nuclear Detection Architecture. These documents provide a framework for nations that are developing or enhancing nuclear-detection programs and capabilities. This work helps support the triad of law enforcement, intelligence, and technology by developing effective strategies to design nuclear-detection architectures, deploy equipment, and conduct effective detection-oriented operations.
Present Generation Technology to Detect Nuclear Threats
Integrating intelligence, law enforcement, and technology is essential to an effective nuclear-detection architecture. Within the United States, DNDO is responsible for the robust R&D, characterization, testing, evaluation, and acquisition of current and next-generation nuclear- and radiological-detection technologies.
Important changes in technology over the past decade have provided opportunities to better integrate nuclear detection into counterterrorism operations. Thirty years ago, identification of detected radioactive material required laboratory specialists and large, complicated equipment. Since then, however, advances in computing, communications, algorithm development, and hardware have contributed to a revolution in detection technology. These technological advances in detection of nuclear and radiological material have made possible strategies and approaches for nuclear detection that were technically infeasible in the past.
The predominant, currently deployed technologies for nuclear detection include:
- Personal radiation detectors (PRDs) are the primary "wearable" method for detecting nuclear and radiological materials in support of the nuclear-detection mission. They are sometimes used as a "tripwire" to detect the presence of radiation, after which more robust detectors are brought in to confirm the presence and identify the source of the radiation. Newer versions of these devices provide spectroscopic capabilities, suitable for the isotopic identification of nuclear and radioactive materials. The compact size of PRDs makes them ideal tools for frontline operators such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection or U.S. Coast Guard personnel, as well as federal, state, local, and tribal law-enforcement services.
- Hand-held radioisotope identification devices (RIIDs) are portable systems designed to detect and identify radioactive materials and sources. Different types of RIIDS are procured, deployed, and used by law enforcement or technical experts at various laboratories, POEs, and checkpoints, as well as for mobile operations.
- Backpack radiation detectors, which are housed in a portable form-factor with shoulder straps, are often capable of detecting both gamma and neutron emissions. Some are capable of identifying specific isotopes. Such systems are used in either covert or overt operational modes, generally to help search for radiological or nuclear materials.
- Radiation portal monitors (RPMs) are large, passive detectors, typically composed of polyvinyl toluene (PVT) for gamma detection and helium-3 (3He) for neutron detection. RPMs can scan larger conveyances like cars and trucks, along with cargo, and are often seen at checkpoints or officially designated ports of entry and exit (e.g., maritime container ports). Operationally, PVT RPMs scan for the presence of radiation and are typically coupled with handheld RIID systems used in a secondary scanning mode to distinguish threatening materials from naturally occurring radioactive materials or legitimate radiation found in the stream of commerce. Newer versions of portal monitors also boast spectroscopic identification capability and employ alternative neutron-detection (non-3He) materials.
- Mobile and transportable detectors generally use gamma-sensitive detectors, e.g., PVT or sodium iodide, along with arrays of 3He counters for neutron detection. They are mounted either in vehicles or trailers, or in other transportable form-factors. They can be used for area surveillance, search, or other temporary deployments, such as between official ports of entry or at interior chokepoints.
- Radiographic imaging systems employ x-rays or gamma rays to image containers and vehicles and to identify anomalies in their contents. They are capable of revealing the presence of shielding that conceals nuclear and radiological material. Images are reviewed individually and can therefore require time and skill to ascertain anomalies that might indicate suspicious cargo.
- Other technologies such as high-resolution gamma spectroscopy, large (i.e., larger than handheld) spectroscopic detectors, spectroscopic portal monitors, neutron detectors, and other devices are also currently in use, but deployments are limited.
DNDO has focused a considerable amount of attention on addressing the challenges of effective threat detection through further research and development, testing, and evaluation characterization. The aforementioned technologies provide detection capabilities against a certain range of threats, and are relatively inexpensive and easy to use and maintain.
Next-Generation and Advanced Systems
To further advance detector performance and operation, DNDO derives R&D needs from analysis of potential gaps in the GNDA, as well as from recognized technology limitations. DNDO seeks to overcome any perceived technology limitations in order to yield performance improvements for nuclear-detection systems while reducing their operational burden, including life-cycle or maintenance costs. DNDO analysis and R&D examine ways to further develop and refine operational concepts, for example by networking detectors and locating or tracking sources, both stationary and mobile. Further innovations and enhancements will allow for continual improvement in the ways detectors are deployed and used.
DNDO focuses considerable effort on cutting-edge technologies, developed both in laboratory and simulated environments, to create a pipeline of potential new systems for use in the field. For example, advanced work on networked detectors through the intelligent radiation sensor system (IRSS) demonstration has facilitated improved situational awareness and better capabilities to detect, identify, locate, and track threats across distributed sensors. The IRSS advanced-technology demonstration will optimize the ability to detect, localize, and identify radioactive sources by integrating data from multiple portable radiation detectors. The IRSS is a demonstration of an inter-communicating radiation-detector system that fuses radiation, spatial, and temporal data from small mobile sensors with the goal of improving overall system performance and providing a more robust detection capability.
As noted above, the intelligent radiation sensing system is a breakthrough technology that networks a group of portable radiation detectors. Using a networked system, the IRSS can determine with high confidence the presence, location, and type of radiological material in an area more quickly and accurately than can a group of individual detectors. The program creates a robust and flexible network architecture along with advanced data-fusion algorithms that combine information from many detectors. The IRSS program provides advanced search and monitoring capabilities across a large coverage area, and in difficult operational environments.
Moving forward, next-generation technologies will certainly enhance the way we currently deploy and operate detectors, but technology is only one part of that challenge. DNDO will continue to explore opportunities to pair technology with appropriate operations and protocols in order to maximize the effectiveness of detectors and systems. Bringing together law enforcement, intelligence and threat information, and detection technologies is a key objective for DNDO in coordinating and implementing the GNDA. Enhanced radiological and nuclear-detection capability will continue to play a critical role in the successful implementation of UNSCR 1540 as it pertains to countering threats from both nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.
The role of consultancy in nonproliferation
The latest report from the 1540 Committee (S/2011/579 of September 14, 2011) instructively recommends that the Committee, states, and international, regional and subregional organizations cooperate with academia, industry, and civil society where appropriate, taking a long-term approach that contributes to national implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1540. To date, however, the role private companies, and especially consultancies, could play in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 has not been leveraged sufficiently. The unique techniques private consultancies use, their implied impartiality, and their efficiency could be of tremendous relevance to putting UNSCR 1540 into force.
The Non-Conventional Threat: CBRNe Asia
Security in Southeast Asia is a priority. It is for this reason that IB Consultancy decided to organize a conference dubbed "Non-Conventional Threat: CBRNe Asia 2012." Held in Bangkok, Thailand, it was the first and largest chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNe) conference, exhibition, and exercise at one unique venue in Asia. The event brought together experts, end-users, policymakers, industry, and procurement staff, not only from the Southeast Asian region, but also from Europe, the USA, and the Middle East.
On the first day of the event, a pre-conference workshop was held at the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Bangkok. The workshop was a networking event for stakeholders who actively take part in Southeast Asia's CBRNe dialogue. Representatives from Australia, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, the Netherlands, Vietnam, United Kingdom, the USA, the IAEA, INTERPOL, the NATO WMD Center, and the OPCW gathered to discuss the main-CBRNe related challenges for the Southeast Asian region and to agree upon possible solutions.
The key questions put to the audience during the workshop centered on what has been achieved and what possibilities exist for improving existing policies and capabilities. During a brainstorming session, the delegates agreed upon a list of CBRNe-related challenges in the Southeast Asia region. The priority that ranked highest among workshop participants is the need to refine governments' perception of the CBRNe threat and convince governments to make it a priority. This could be achieved, for instance, by identifying commonly agreed threats as "public health" or "anti-smuggling" issues, thus superimposing a CBRNe dimension on these threats.
The second-highest priority is to establish a multinational Southeast Asia "regional agency" to lead in the field of CBRNe. At present there is no agency in the region that specifically addresses this issue. Such a body should develop an agreed perception of risk in the field of CBRNe. A related priority would be to seek international assistance and coordination for implementing international CBRNe-related conventions. In this perspective, interagency and cross-border collaboration should also be improved.
Another striking priority identified by the regional stakeholders was the need to involve the private sector. During the discussions of this priority, it became clear that all relevant resources should be harnessed to counter the CBRN threat in Southeast Asia. To date, the potential role of the private sector has not been explored sufficiently. Including the private sector in meeting UNSCR 1540 requirements is a logical step endorsed by the latest report from the 1540 Committee. Ideas expressed for enlisting private industry ranged from urging the CBRNe industry to focus on ASEAN/Pacific product needs, increasing public-private cooperation, and encouraging industry to help raise community awareness of the CBRNe threat. Of note is that Singapore is quite advanced in this. For example, the Singapore Metro actively contributes to public education by including commuters in exercises and distributing educational materials on what to do in case of a CBRNe incident.
The value added by including private industry in countering the CBRNe threat was the leitmotif of the NCT: CBRNe Asia conference. Only by bringing together the complete spectrum of stakeholders in the field of CBRN can trust among all players be created and new ideas emerge. It is noteworthy that the conference was organized by an independent party that was not obliged to do so by any implementation scheme and was not commissioned by a third party. Quite the reverse: we took the initiative to organize this conference because we saw the need for stakeholders to come together and create synergies.
Benefits of working with private consultants
The impartial position of private consultancies could be leveraged much more in the implementation of UNSCR 1540. Whereas states have particular interests and NGOs may define their mission idealistically, consultants are better placed to act and deliver in a "SMART" way: Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant and Timely.
Consultants are used to working as a "third party." Most of them are trained to work in a complex environment featuring multiple stakeholders and diverging interests. For consultancies to survive in a fierce competitive environment, they must be able to quickly adapt to new circumstances and the needs of their clients. This makes them flexible, agile, and creative. Consultants are results-oriented and therefore not necessarily focused on process. Indeed, consultants are known for deploying alternative techniques and methodologies to reach their objectives.
One big misunderstanding regarding consultants is cost. Many governments believe consultants are expensive, or at least more expensive than NGOs, government institutes, and academics. This is merely an urban myth. The myth has been retold many times, but is simply overstated and potentially misleading. Consultants often work for the same cost or more cheaply than their not-for-profit counterparts. Efficiency, state-of-the-art technology and methodologies, and a drive to deliver within budget make consultants an effective and cost-effective choice.
A good example of a methodology used by consultants in relation to UNSCR 1540 is the IPACT toolbox. IPACT—the Implementation Program Against CBRNe Terrorism—grew out of the "International Seminar on National Implementation of Nonproliferation Obligations" held in Jahorina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, on June 22-23, 2009 under OPCW auspices. IPACT is designed to develop a more integrated, more holistic approach toward implementing measures aimed at quelling CBRNe proliferation in the western Balkans. The program aims at developing comprehensive national strategies to improve and sustain the capacity to counter WMD proliferation and terrorism, and at promoting best international and national standards and practices to help stakeholders discharge their obligations.
When approaching the danger of CBRNe proliferation, one often refers to the problems of safeguards (nonproliferation), security (the threat of terrorism and radicalism), and safety (accidents). IPACT takes a holistic approach by integrating efforts across all three areas. The basis for this approach is a Functionality Approach, a consultancy methodology developed by IB Consultancy that is used in many different security areas, including critical-infrastructure protection, nonproliferation, CBRN crisis management, and airline security. From a consultancy perspective, most international support programs lack a structured methodology (by which we do not mean to imply that they are not structured!), whereas IPACT is a fully structured methodology in which each step of the program can be monitored, assessed, and replayed. In IPACT, the scan is based on a concept of different functions a country needs to perform to achieve a certain objective.
The methodologies, models, and tools for managing this multifaceted and multi-stakeholder approach have been developed in one pilot Southeastern European country, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Conclusions and recommendations (generic or region-specific) will be extracted from the pilot project in cooperation with other regional and international partners. These tools can then be used by other countries to help develop integrated nonproliferation systems (policies, infrastructure, mechanisms, and procedures) and further
enhance regional coordination of these measures.
Outlook for the future
The regional approach of IPACT in the western Balkans would also be highly beneficial for Southeast Asia. This became clear during the workshop in Bangkok. Although states are responsible for meeting the requirements of UNSCR 1540, most of the suggested solutions related to the region as whole, obviating a solely national outlook. A first and logical step for action spanning the region would be to identify all CBRNe-related agencies there. Subsequently, a recognized network of CBRNe-related points of contact in Southeast Asia can be established, leveraging existing initiatives such as those administered by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the EU Centers of Excellence. This would establish the foundation for more concrete, concerted efforts to counter the CBRNe threat to the region and implement UNSCR 1540.
Efforts to implement UNSCR 1540 and bolster nonproliferation in general would benefit enormously from the practices used by consultancies. Neutrality coupled with the drive to deliver concrete deliverables through novel techniques and approaches could strengthen the universal fight against proliferation, yielding tangible results at lower cost.
Events such as conferences and small exercises are necessary to promote and continue the dialogue on CBRNe in the Southeast Asian region. Establishing mutual trust and understanding is essential to countering the CBRNe threat in a region that, once destabilized by a significant CBRN incident (or accident), would undercut the stability of the rest of the world. That trust and understanding can only grow by continued open, frank dialogue and multi-actor cooperation. The aforementioned events and conferences offer a vehicle of choice for achieving exactly that. This year in Kuala Lumpur, IB Consultancy and the National Defense University of Malaysia will bring together regional stakeholders to discuss progress in regional cooperation and identify new challenges. We invite you to join us for the 2013 edition of NCT: CBRNe Asia.
The Tarnow Declaration was developed in the run-up to the International Meeting on Chemical Safety and Security held in Tarnow, Poland on November 8-9, 2012. The meeting, attended by over 200 participants from 56 countries and international organizations, industry, academia, and NGOs, was the first global and multi-stakeholder event to discuss chemical safety and security issues with due regard to their relevance to UNSCR 1540. The rationale behind the meeting was to foster wide recognition of the global importance of safety and security for the chemical industry and trade. Safety and security measures have a common objective of protecting human lives, society, and the environment, while chemical safety and security culture is an effective tool to make these measures sustainable.
The Declaration welcomes the establishment of the International Center for Chemical Safety and Security (ICCSS) in Tarnow, and invites national and international partners to cooperate with the center to build capacity, conduct training, exchange best practices, and tighten cooperation among stakeholders. The document whose short summary can be found below is a pioneering effort at promoting international cooperation in chemical safety and security, and at nurturing chemical security culture on a global scale.
Acknowledging the importance of growing chemical industry and activities, globally, the Declaration calls for an increased importance of chemical safety and security in the development, production, infrastructure, and supply chain of chemicals. One of the key ingredients of that is solid and synergetic chemical safety and security culture, which ensures that workforce at all stages of chemical cycle understand and proactively employ best safety and security practices, and that human life and the environment are adequately protected. The Declaration calls for all stakeholders, including governments, regulators, industry, academia, NGOs and the media to help enhance chemical safety and security culture and to coordinate their activities both nationally and internationally.
The Declaration also proposes:
- Extending the scope of chemical safety and security beyond the site and the promotion of better culture among all stakeholders;
- Improving supply chain security for all components of the chemical production cycle;
- Encouraging countries and organizations to enhance and support chemical safety and security at national and regional levels through dedicated programs, centers of excellence and specially-designed industry self-regulation measures;
- Offering, through the ICCSS, an international venue for capacity building, best practice exchanges, training and cooperation to improve safety and security standards and culture worldwide;
- Assisting developing countries in improving and sustaining chemical safety and security by helping assess needs, generate resources, and facilitate outside help where necessary;
- Working with the private sector where necessary through public-private partnerships;
- Actively engaging research community and academia to raise their safety and security awareness, and seek advice for better safety and security implementation;
- Employing all necessary measures to promote the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the UNSCR 1540 and other related international norms;
- Promoting better chemical safety and security culture at the levels of the facility, industry, country, region, and internationally.
For the full text of the Declaration, more information about the ICCSS and the meeting on chemical safety and security, visit the website at http://www.iccss.com.pl/events/international-meeting/background-materials-and-presentations.
Opportunities for Engagement
The Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria hosted a forum in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. The gathering was organized by the Steering Committee of the Forum. The three-day session was held at the Vienna International Center from January 8-10, 2013.
The event built on Austria's prior support for UNSCR 1540 implementation. Vienna has acted as coordinator of the 1540 Committee's working group on cooperation with international organizations. During and after its membership in the UN Security Council in 2009 and 2010, Austria continued supporting the work of the Committee and contributing to the implementation of UNSCR 1540. Recent changes in the institutional landscape in Vienna have included adding the Vienna Center on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation and a Vienna office of the UNODA to the international organizations (the IAEA, CTBTO, UNODC, the OSCE, and WINS) already present in Vienna. The new additions enhanced the existing critical mass of expertise and resources relating to UNSCR 1540 while facilitating the conduct of meetings in Vienna.
The first UNSCR 1540 Civil Society Forum took place against the background of growing recognition of civil society's role in supporting states' implementation of UNSCR 1540. The event was convened to mobilize additional support for the full implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), specifically through incorporating civil society more fully into national and international efforts to achieve the objectives of the resolution. The forum was envisioned as a meeting to assess prior contributions by various civil-society groups to UNSCR 1540 work, share best practices, and identify specific areas and formats for more effective engagement and contributions. In so doing, the meeting was designed to facilitate interaction and encourage collaboration on UNSCR 1540-related issues at the national, regional, and international levels, and between civil-society groups such as academia, think-tanks, charities, and regional NGOs.
The forum marked the first face-to-face encounter among members of civil-society groups from diverse backgrounds and levels of involvement in UNSCR 1540 activities. Individuals from forty-five civil-society organizations and seven international organizations took part. In addition, a number of representatives from UN member states attended as observers. The geographical representation was very diverse, including participants from Asia, North Africa, southern Africa, Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas.
Ambassador Alexander Kmentt, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria, opened the Civil Society Forum. The opening segment featured a video message from UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane, who conveyed a message from the UN Secretary-General to the forum participants. Ms. Elena Sokova, executive director of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), welcomed the participants on behalf of the Steering Committee of the Forum, a body composed of representatives from the Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria, the Henry L. Stimson Center, the Institute for Security Studies, the National University of Malaysia, the Nonproliferation for Global Security Foundation (NPSGlobal), the Polish Institute of International Affairs, the Stanley Foundation, the UNODA office in Vienna, the Verification Research, Training and Information Center, and the VCDNP.
The first panel reviewed the objectives of resolution 1540 (2004), the status of its implementation, and associated challenges. Presentations were made by Ms. Dana Perkins, a 1540 Committee expert, and Mr. Nikita Smidovich, of UNODA. Both speakers highlighted the opportunities for engagement enhanced by the ten-year extension of the resolution.
Following the opening day, a reception sponsored by the Stanley Foundation featured speeches from Mr. Kees Nederlof, Dutch Sous-Sherpa for the Nuclear Security Summit, and Mr. Miles Pomper, who represented the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Fissile Material Working Group. The speakers discussed current initiatives pertaining to the Nuclear Security Summit process, the summits' relevance to UNSCR 1540, and methods for further involvement of civil society in nonproliferation. A side event at the forum reminded the participants of WMD threats and non-state actors, ethics and nonproliferation, and the importance of raising awareness and building capacity to deal with these threats.
A roundtable discussion held on the second day of the forum provided an opportunity for participants to broach ideas for collaborative efforts, broaden the debate to different segments of civil society, and contribute to closing gaps and addressing challenges in the implementation of UNSCR 1540. The depth and diversity of knowledge and expertise filling the conference room were very conducive to generating concrete proposals from the participating organizations.
The meeting highlighted the following main areas in which civil society can support UNSCR 1540-related initiatives: awareness raising and outreach; technical and scientific expertise; education and training; dissemination of best practices; and monitoring and assessment of the implementation of UNSCR 1540.
The forum provided the participants an opportunity to offer their expertise to others, discuss possible collaborative projects, including across different areas of expertise, and become acquainted with other groups and organizations with similar interests and initiatives. Participants more experienced in UNSCR 1540 work were able to share their knowledge with newcomers while profiting from fresh ideas and suggestions from new groups in the field, and from organizations from complementary areas of expertise. A number of concrete projects and collaborative opportunities were proposed and discussed during the three days of the forum.
To strengthen communication and cooperation and facilitate further engagement, participants considered establishing regular communication mechanisms between different stakeholders and among the civil-society groups. A website dedicated to UNSCR 1540 issues hosted by Stimson Center and supported by the Stanley Foundation was offered as such a platform. The 1540 Compass, a recently launched journal based at the University of Georgia, USA, can also bridge the communication gap among different civil-society groups, helping them become full-fledged 1540 stakeholders.
Participants acknowledged that the Forum offered much more than just information- and expertise-sharing. It provided an essential networking opportunity. Collective brainstorming continued well beyond the formal sessions, side events, roundtable discussion, and group meetings. The interaction within private meetings, group discussions, and email exchanges continued after the formal closing of the forum.
Financial support for the Forum came from the Austrian Ministry for European and International Affairs, the UNODA, the governments of the United States and Norway, and the Stanley Foundation.
A more detailed overview of the forum, its outcomes, and further steps will be offered in the next issue of the 1540 Compass.
|Peacebuilding 2013: Pacem in terris at 50||Features “leading scholars, policymakers, and practitioners to discuss topics such as human rights today, development, military policy, reconciliation, the environment and peace.”||April 9-10, 2013||Catholic Peacebuilding Network||Washington, DC|
|International Conference on Effective Nuclear Regulatory Systems||Aims at enhancing the regulations of nuclear facilities and highlighting safety and security culture, international cooperation, communication, and transparency.||April 8-12, 2013||IAEA||Ottawa, Canada|
|All Hazards Response 2013||International meeting of experts from CBRN-related fields, disaster medicine and emergency management. Designed to broaden the skills of participants and enhance the readiness of those responding to related emergencies.||April 16-17, 2013||CBRNE World Magazine, partnered with Enterprise Ireland, Serenity Irish Security Research Network, and Oglaigh na hEireann (Defense Forces Ireland)||Dublin, Ireland|
|Third CWC Review Conference||Will examine the role of the Chemical Weapons Convention in enhancing international peace and security, as well as measure the CWC’s universality.||April 8-19, 2013||OPCW||The Hague|
|Counter Terror Expo||Conference drawing together experts in the field of counterterrorism to “define operational strategies and to help shape future policy within the secure conclave of a conference.”||April 24-25, 2013||SPIE||Olympia, London|
|Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives Sensing||Will review and discuss emerging technologies in the field of optics and photonics and their application to security. Featuring a number of keynote speakers to “provide the latest overview of governmental department missions relevant to this industry.”||April 29-May 3, 2013||SPIE||Baltimore, Maryland, United States|
|Responsible Care Conference and Exhibition||Symposium of experts with the goal of advocating best practices in the chemical industry. The conference aims at building a “strong corporate process and product safety culture, systems and measures to drive performance in your organization.”||May 5-8, 2013||American Chemistry Council||Miami, Florida|
|11th International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents||Will focus on a wide range of topics, including chem/bio nonproliferation, medical industry outreach, and detection techniques.||June 3-5, 2013||Swedish Defense Research Agency, Swedish Armed Forces, National Defense College||Stockholm, Sweden|
|Non-Conventional Threat CBRNe Israel||The event will focus on “the Israeli approach to CBRNe and C-IED defense.” It will bring together experts primarily from the United States and Israel, with backgrounds in “military, government, and special forces.”||June 4-6, 2013||IB Consultancy||Tel Aviv, Israel|
|40th Session CTBTO Preparatory Commission||Will focus on preparing the itinerary of the CTBTO, as well as general implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.||June 13-14, 2013||Vienna, Austria|
|17th Annual International Conference on Economics and Security||Series of talks and workshops that will cover “a wide range of topics relating to the economics and political economy of conflict, peace, security, military expenditure and armaments.”||June 14-15, 2013||SIPRI, in collaboration with Economists for Peace and Security||Stockholm, Sweden|
|CTBTO Science and Technology 2013 Conference||The conference aims to “capitalize on scientific and technological innovations for verifying CTBT compliance,” as well as to “promote the wider scientific application of data used for test-ban verification.”||June 17-21, 2013||Vienna, Austria|
|International Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Power in the 21st Century||Will focus on “the role and viability of nuclear power in sustainable development, including climate change mitigation, and in meeting the growing global requirements for electricity; the status and prospects of nuclear power for the future, including the importance of nuclear safety and security as necessary prerequisites for nuclear power; and various technical aspects involved in the development of nuclear power.”||June 27-29, 2013||IAEA||St. Petersburg, Russia|
|International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts||A conference organized to “review the international community’s experience and achievements to date in strengthening nuclear security, to enhance understanding of current approaches to nuclear security worldwide and identify trends, and to provide a global forum for policymakers and senior officials to formulate views on the future directions and priorities for nuclear security.”||July 1-5, 2013||IAEA||Vienna, Austria|
|Non-Conventional Threat: CBRNe Asia 2013||Conference addressing threats from CBRNe proliferation. Will include “focused interactive training-workshops, live product demonstrations and the NCT CBRNe Awards.”||September 24-27, 2013||IB Consultancy||Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia|
|5th Annual International Symposium on Biosecurity and Biosafety: Future Trends and Solutions||Will discuss “new trends, new tools, new implementation opportunities on biosafety and biosecurity,” featuring “outstanding international experts and presents key topics and ideas on the latest researches, technologies and strategic programmes on the subject.”||October 9-11, 2013||Clinical Microbiology L. Sacco University Hospital Milan, in collaboration with EBSA and with the support of the Italian Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Interior||Milan, Italy|
|56th Annual Biological Safety Conference||Will address the challenges posed to the implementation of biosecurity and biosafety. Will feature panels and showcases demonstrating best-practice procedures, as well as new products and services.||October 17-23, 2013||American Biological Safety Organization||Kansas City, Missouri|
|International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources: Maintaining the Continuous Global Control of Sources throughout their Life Cycle||“Reviewing progress made in implementing, at the global level, the Code and the requirements and guidelines set out in relevant publications in the IAEA Safety Standards Series and the IAEA Nuclear Security Series since the Bordeaux conference in 2005, and sharing experience, lessons learned and good practices; Addressing remaining challenges and constraints with regard to ensuring the safety and security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle.”||October 27-31, 2013||IAEA||Abu Dhabi, UAE|
"...5. Decides to continue to provide the 1540 Committee with the assistance of experts, and to this end:
(a) Requests the Secretary-General to establish, in consultation with the 1540 Committee, a group of up to eight experts ("group of experts"), acting under the direction and purview of the Committee, composed of individuals with the appropriate experience and knowledge to provide the Committee with expertise, to assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate under resolutions 1540 (2004), 1673 (2006), 1810 (2008) and this resolution, including through facilitation of assistance to improve implementation of resolution 1540 (2004);
(b) Requests, in that regard, the 1540 Committee to consider recommendations for the Committee and the group of experts on expertise requirements, broad geographic representation, working methods, modalities, and structure, including consideration of the feasibility of a coordination and leadership position of the group of experts, and to present these recommendations to the Security Council no later than August 31, 2011..."
"...Requests the Secretary-General to increase the size of the group of experts referred to in paragraph 5 (a) of resolution 1977 (2011) to up to nine experts..."
Published by the Center for International Trade & Security, University of Georgia
in cooperation with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs